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An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/science.1062872

Cites

11 of 11 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Stroop J. R., J. Exp. Psychol. 72, 219 (1935).
  2. Testing materials (dilemmas) are available from Science Online at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5537/2105/DC1.
  3. J. D. Haidt Psych. Rev. in press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D.
Affiliations
  • Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior,
  • Princeton University (US)
  • University of Pittsburgh (US)
Corresponding author
Greene, Joshua D.
Venue
Science
Published
2001-09-14
Volume
293
Issue
5537
Pages
2105-2108
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W2129900561
Cited by
4,561
References
11
Citations by year
2026: 171 · 2025: 218 · 2024: 187 · 2023: 199 · 2022: 243 · 2021: 239 · 2020: 218 · 2019: 280 · 2018: 220 · 2017: 247 · 2016: 203 · 2015: 216 · 2014: 225 · 2013: 242 · 2012: 229
FWCI
25.11
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
moral judgment, ethical dilemmas, emotional engagement, reason and emotion, moral psychology, rationalist tradition, moral intuitions
MeSH terms
Brain, Brain Mapping, Emotions, Female, Humans, Judgment, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Mental Processes, Morals, Reaction Time

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