The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems
Abstract
Learning to Work Together: In group endeavors, there is often a tension between working for the greater good of the group as a whole versus working for one's own benefit. Sometimes these paths coincide and sometimes they do not; furthermore, the choices made by other group members can influence the calculation of which path to take. A pair of studies now approaches this challenge from experimental and theoretical points of view. In a forest or fishery, harvesting of wood or food needs to take into account the renewable character of the resource, as well as spatial heterogeneity. Janssen et al. (p. 613 ; see the Perspective by Putterman ) show that communication among the group members is key, both to establishing a maintainable rate of harvesting, as well as enforcement via punishment of noncompliers. Boyd et al. (p. 617 ; see the Perspective by Putterman ) develop a model showing that punishment, which is a costly activity, is most effectively levied when implemented with the approval of group members; that is, coordinated punishment works to the benefit of the whole, whereas individual actions do not.
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Citations
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Janssen, M. A., Holahan, R., Lee, A., & Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2010-04-30
- Volume
- 328
- Issue
- 5978
- Pages
- 613-617
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2050431763
- Cited by
- 347
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 68.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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