The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems
Abstract
Learning to Work Together: In group endeavors, there is often a tension between working for the greater good of the group as a whole versus working for one's own benefit. Sometimes these paths coincide and sometimes they do not; furthermore, the choices made by other group members can influence the calculation of which path to take. A pair of studies now approaches this challenge from experimental and theoretical points of view. In a forest or fishery, harvesting of wood or food needs to take into account the renewable character of the resource, as well as spatial heterogeneity. Janssen et al. (p. 613 ; see the Perspective by Putterman ) show that communication among the group members is key, both to establishing a maintainable rate of harvesting, as well as enforcement via punishment of noncompliers. Boyd et al. (p. 617 ; see the Perspective by Putterman ) develop a model showing that punishment, which is a costly activity, is most effectively levied when implemented with the approval of group members; that is, coordinated punishment works to the benefit of the whole, whereas individual actions do not.
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Citations
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“So far, the proposed Commons Game is quite similar to the dynamic game used in human behavioral experiments [16, 18, 17, 14, 15].”
BackgroundInfluentialRobustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons
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Cooperative resilience in artificial intelligence multiagent systems
Chacon-Chamorro, M., Felipe Giraldo, L., Quijano, N., Vargas-Panesso, V., González, C., Pinzón, J. S., Manrique, R., Ríos, M., Fonseca, Y., Gómez-Barrera, D., et al. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1109/tai.2025.3567371 · Cited by 5
“This setup is inspired by the study conducted by [50].”
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation and cooperation in human groups
McKee, K. R., Hughes, E., Zhu, T. O., Chadwick, M. J., Koster, R., Castaneda, A. G., Beattie, C., Graepel, T., Botvinick, M., & Leibo, J. Z. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2103.04982 · Cited by 5
“Tasks with rich spatial and temporal dynamics have been used in a small percentage of prior experimental studies (e.g., [23, 24]).”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Janssen, M. A., Holahan, R., Lee, A., & Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2010-04-30
- Volume
- 328
- Issue
- 5978
- Pages
- 613-617
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2050431763
- Cited by
- 347
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 68.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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