The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Avoiding overhead aversion in charity
Abstract
How to increase charitable donations: Charities could raise more money from more people if they were to announce that a startup grant had been used to defray overhead expenses. Gneezy et al. told 40,000 potential donors that an initial donation (half of the target amount) would be used as seed money, as a source of matching funds, or for covering administrative and fundraising costs. When the money was assigned to cover administration, twice as many people made donations. Science , this issue p. 632
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Cited by
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Holzmeister, F., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Nave, G., Nosek, B. A., Pfeiffer, T., et al. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0399-z · Cited by 1,521
Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk
Exley, C. L. (2016) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv051 · Cited by 304
Promoting cooperation in the field
Kraft-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006 · Cited by 178
Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4 · Cited by 135
Park, Y. J., & Matkin, D. S. T. (2021) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13269 · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Gneezy, U., Keenan, E. A., & Gneezy, A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2014-10-31
- Volume
- 346
- Issue
- 6209
- Pages
- 632-635
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2065998067
- Cited by
- 331
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 58.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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