Cited by 381Social Robot Interaction and HRISpeech and dialogue systemsEthics and Social Impacts of AI

Talking about Large Language Models

Open access
Shanahan, Murray·2024·Communications of the ACM

Abstract

Interacting with a contemporary LLM-based conversational agent can create an illusion of being in the presence of a thinking creature. Yet, in their very nature, such systems are fundamentally not like us.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This conceptual article argues that large language models should be understood primarily as next-token predictors, so anthropomorphic descriptions of them can mislead users and developers. It recommends caution with terms such as “believes” and “knows,” while allowing that belief-like descriptions may become less misleading when LLMs are embedded in richer systems with tools, multimodal input, or embodiment.

Key findings

  • A bare-bones LLM models statistical distributions of tokens and generates likely continuations; it does not itself distinguish truth from falsehood or possess beliefs in the full sense.
  • Anthropomorphic language can be harmless as shorthand under the intentional stance, but with powerful LLMs it risks encouraging overestimation or underestimation of capabilities.
  • Embedding an LLM in a larger system that consults external sources, processes images, or controls a robot can make talk of knowledge or belief less problematic, but this depends on the system’s architecture and how language relates to the world.
  • Reasoning-like behavior from LLMs, including chain-of-thought prompting, is better described as pattern completion than as guaranteed faithful logical inference.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis rather than an empirical study; no dataset, sample, or statistical test is reported.
  • The argument proceeds through illustrative examples, including factual question answering, fictional-world prompts, dialogue agents, vision-language models, and the SayCan robotic system.
  • It compares bare-bones LLMs with embedded systems and examines related topics such as emergence, external information sources, embodiment, reasoning, generalization, and fine-tuning with human feedback.

Limitations

  • The author states that the article does not advocate any particular account of belief or intention and takes no position on meaning in LLMs, focusing instead on how words are used.
  • The author notes that a theoretical understanding of LLMs’ inner workings remains pending, despite some relevant work.
  • Evident from the text: the discussion is conceptual, relies on illustrative or fictional examples, and its conclusions about belief-like capacities depend heavily on the specific architecture and embodiment of the system being considered.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3624724

Cites

45 of 45 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

18 of 24 cited sources checked · 2 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Interpretationcitation
    § What about Embodiment?

    One way to build a trustworthy reasoning system using LLMs is to embed them in an algorithm that is faithful to logic because it realizes the same causal structure.

    “One way to build a trustworthy reasoning system using LLMs is to embed them in an algorithm that is similarly faithful to logic because it realizes the same causal structure.8,9”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [8] 8. Lake, B.M. and Murphy, G.L. Word meaning in minds and machines. Psychological Rev. 130, 2 (2023), 401-431. source

      Section 7.5 (pp. 39–40) says that explicit relations are needed for correct inferences and suggests combining neural networks with a knowledge base to encourage consistency. It does not propose embedding LLMs in a logic-faithful algorithm, or say that such an algorithm would be trustworthy because it realizes the same causal structure. (LLM, conf=0.81)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [9] 9. Nye, M. et al. Show your work: Scratchpads for intermediate computation with language models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.00114 (2021). source

      Section 2 (Method; page unavailable) describes training a language model to write an algorithm’s intermediate steps to a scratchpad, which supports the general idea of using an algorithmic procedure to aid reasoning. The paper does not say that this makes a system trustworthy or faithful to logic by realizing the same causal structure. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation
    § What about Embodiment?

    A deductive theorem prover can be trusted because its generated sequences are faithful to logic, with a computational causal structure mirroring the truth-preserving inferential structure of the problem.

    “We can trust a deductive theorem prover because the sequences of sentences it generates are faithful to logic, in the sense that they are the result of an underlying computational process whose causal structure mirrors the truth-preserving inferential structure of the problem.8”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [8] 8. Lake, B.M. and Murphy, G.L. Word meaning in minds and machines. Psychological Rev. 130, 2 (2023), 401-431. source

      Section 7.5 (p. 39) discusses how semantic models need explicit relations to draw correct inferences, but it does not address deductive theorem provers. Searches for “theorem prover,” “truth-preserving,” and deductive logical inference found no passage explaining why a theorem prover’s outputs can be trusted or describing the claimed mirroring of causal and inferential structure. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    A simple LLM-based question-answering system like BOT will generate more appropriate responses if they conform to script-like dialogue patterns than to actual human conversation patterns.

    “BOT will be much better at generating appropriate responses if they conform to this pattern rather than to the pattern of actual human conversation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § What LLMs Do and How They Work

    When an LLM answers a factual prompt, it is not answering about the world but producing a statistically likely continuation.

    “In an important sense, we are not really asking who the first person was to walk on the Moon.We are asking the model the following question: Given the statistical distribution of words in the vast public corpus of (English) text, what words are most likely to follow the sequence,”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § LLMs and the Intentional Stance

    Knowing which word is likely to follow another is not the same as knowing the corresponding fact.

    “knowing that the word”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 26
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 22
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 4
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    A simple LLM-based question-answering system has no communicative intent and does not know that questions come from a person or that a person receives its answers.

    “a simple LLM-based question-answering system, such as BOT, has no communicative intent.3 In no meaningful sense, even under the license of the intentional stance, does it know that the questions it is asked come from a person or that a person is on the receiving end of its answers.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [3] 3. Kojima, T. et al. Large language models are zero-shot reasoners. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.11916 (2022). source

      The Background (p. 3) describes LLMs as models that estimate probabilities over text, and the Two-stage prompting section (p. 4) describes how they generate answers to questions. Neither passage addresses communicative intent or whether a system knows that people ask and receive its answers; searches for those concepts found no relevant passage. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    An LLM encodes knowledge in the way an encyclopedia does, and one emergent property is that it encodes everyday-world knowledge that no encyclopedia captures.

    “it can reasonably be claimed that one emergent property of an LLM is that it encodes kinds of knowledge of the everyday world and the way it works that no encyclopedia captures.18”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [18] 18. Shanahan, M. and Mitchell, M. Abstraction for deep reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the 31 st Intern. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (2022), 5588-5596. source

      Section 3.5, “Abstraction Through Language” (page unavailable), discusses large language models as a possible route to abstraction and notes GPT-3’s few-shot generalisation. It does not say that LLMs encode everyday-world knowledge unavailable in encyclopedias. I searched our copy for the encyclopedia comparison and for LLMs’ commonsense knowledge. (LLM, conf=0.72)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § What LLMs Do and How They Work

    Large language models are probabilistic generators of token distributions in big public text corpora, with tokens being words, word fragments, or characters.

    “LLMs are generative mathematical models of the statistical distribution of tokens in the vast public corpus of human-generated text, where the tokens in question include words, parts of words, or individual charactersincluding punctuation marks.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [3] 3. Kojima, T. et al. Large language models are zero-shot reasoners. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.11916 (2022). source

      The Background (p. 3) describes a language model as estimating a probability distribution over text and says larger web-text corpora have helped enable LLMs. The Discussion (p. 10) also says LLMs have been trained on large corpora from various web sources. Our copy does not specify that the corpora are public or define tokens as words, word fragments, characters, or punctuation marks. (LLM, conf=0.86)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [4] 4. Li, Z., Nye, M., and Andreas, J. Implicit representations of meaning in neural language models. In Proceedings of the 59 th Annual Meeting of the Assoc. for Computational Linguistics and the 11 th Intern. Joint Conf. on Natural Language Processing 1, Long Papers (2021). source

      The Introduction (p. 1) says neural language models place probability distributions over sequences of words, and §4.1 (p. 5) names text corpora used to pretrain the models. The paper does not specify that tokens include word fragments, individual characters, or punctuation, or characterize the training material as one vast public corpus of human-generated text. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [20] 20. Stiennon, N. et al. Learning to summarize from human feedback. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (2020), 3008-3021. source

      Section 3.4 (p. 5) says the models predict the next token in a large text corpus, and Appendix B.1 (p. 17) identifies the corpus sources and says the models use byte-pair encoding. The paper does not establish that the entire corpus is public or explicitly describe tokens as words, word fragments, individual characters, and punctuation marks. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation
    § Vision-Language Models

    For a system to have beliefs, it must genuinely engage with the world as its representations depict it.

    “it must”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [33] 33. Chan, S.C. et al. Data distributional properties drive emergent in-context learning in transformers. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (2022). source

      The Discussion (p. 9) addresses in-context learning in transformers, not whether a system must engage with the world to have beliefs. Searches for beliefs, representations, and engagement with the world found no passage addressing that requirement. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § What LLMs Do and How They Work

    When an LLM improves reasoning when told to 'think step by step', the temptation to see it as human-like is almost overwhelming.

    “When an LLM can be made to improve its performance on reasoning tasks simply by being told to”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [17] 17. Schick, T. et al. Toolformer: Language models can teach themselves to use tools. arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.04761 (2023). source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Vision-Language Models

    Vision-language models combine a language model with an image encoder and are trained on text-image pairs, enabling prediction of word continuations in the context of an image.

    “vision-language models (VLMs) such as VilBERT 19 and Flamingo 2 combine a language model with an image encoder and are trained on a multi-modal corpus of text-image pairs.This enables them to predict how a given sequence of words will continue in the context of a given image.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [19] 19. Smith, B.C. The Promise of Artificial Intelligence: Reckoning and Judgment. MIT Press (2019). source

      The Introduction (p. 2) and Section 2.2 (p. 3) describe ViLBERT’s visual and language streams and training on paired images and text. But Section 2.2 describes reconstructing masked words, not predicting word continuations; Related Work (p. 8) says decoding output text from this bidirectional model remains unclear. The continuation-prediction part is therefore not supported for ViLBERT. (LLM, conf=0.90)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [2] 2. Harnad, S. The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena 42, 1-3 (1990), 335-346. source
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § What about Embodiment?

    Chain-of-thought prompting submits a prompt prefix containing examples of multi-step reasoning before the user's query, which encourages the model to show its workings and improves reasoning performance.

    “In chain-of-thought prompting, for example, a prompt prefix is submitted to the model, before the user's query, containing a few examples of multi-step reasoning, with all the intermediate steps explicitly spelled out.23,38 Doing this encourages the model to”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · plain
      “show its workings,”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · plain
      “which improves reasoning performance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [23] 23. Wei, J. et al. Emergent abilities of large language models. Transactions on Machine Learning Research (2022). source
    • cites [38] 38. Dennett, D. Intentional systems theory. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2009), 339-350. source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation
    § Conclusion: Why This Matters

    Today's LLMs and applications are so powerful and convincingly intelligent that the intentional stance's license to use terms like belief and knowledge can no longer safely be applied without risk of misleading about their character and capabilities.

    “However, today's LLMs, and the applications that use them, are so powerful, so convincingly intelligent, that such license can no longer safely be applied.30,39”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [30] 30. Bender, E. and Koller, A. Climbing towards NLU: On meaning, form, and understanding in the age of data. In Proceedings of the 58 th Annual Meeting of the Assoc. for Computational Linguistics (2020), 5185-5198. source

      Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [39] 39. Devlin, J., Chang, M-W., Lee, K., and Toutanova, K. BERT: Pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.04805 (2018). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationcitation
    § How Do LLMs Generalize?

    An LLM with enough parameters trained on a sufficiently large dataset with the right statistical properties can acquire a pattern-completion mechanism with a degree of generality, which is an emergent capability that can solve reasoning problems in a chain-of-thought prompt, though without guarantee of faithfulness to logic.

    “This is a powerful, emergent capability with many useful modes of application, one of which is to solve reasoning problems in the context of a chain-of-thought prompt (although there is no guarantee of faithfulness to logic here, no guarantee that, in the case of deductive reasoning, pattern completion will be truth-preserving).8,9”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [8] 8. Lake, B.M. and Murphy, G.L. Word meaning in minds and machines. Psychological Rev. 130, 2 (2023), 401-431. source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [9] 9. Nye, M. et al. Show your work: Scratchpads for intermediate computation with language models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.00114 (2021). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § How Do LLMs Generalize?

    Fine-tuning a model from human feedback at scale using preference data is a potent technique that can shape responses to reflect user norms, filter toxic language, improve factual accuracy, and mitigate fabrication.

    “Fine-tuning a model from human feedback at scale, using preference data from paid raters or drawn from a large and willing user base, is an especially potent technique.It has the potential not only to shape a model's responses to better reflect user norms (for better or worse), but also to filter out toxic language, improve factual accuracy, and mitigate the tendency to fabricate information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [14] 14. Radford, A. et al. Language models are unsupervised multitask learners. (2019). source

      Sections 2.3 (p. 7) and 2.7 (p. 11) describe collecting human response preferences and fine-tuning on preferred responses. The paper also reports reduced rule violations (p. 3), evidence of improved correctness (section 3.3, p. 18), and an aim to reduce hallucinations (section 2.4, p. 9). It supports the technique’s potential, but does not establish the alternative of drawing preference data from a large, willing user base; its evaluations use paid annotators (section 3.1, p. 14). (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [26] 26. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Basil Blackwell (1953). source
    • cites [34] 34. Chowdhery, S. et al. PaLM: Scaling language modeling with pathways. arXiv preprint arxiv:2204.02311 (2022). source

      The Introduction (p. 5) and Section 10.2 (p. 43) assess toxicity in PaLM’s generated text, but do not assess fine-tuning with human preference data. Searches for “human feedback,” “preference data,” and factual accuracy or fabrication found no passage connecting that technique to the claimed benefits; “human feedback” appears in a reference title (p. 58), not a discussion of those effects. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § What about Emergence?

    Talk of beliefs belongs most naturally to people, and the expectations tied to it rest on shared understanding inherited through evolution.

    “Humans are the natural home of talk of beliefs and the like, and the behavioral expectations that go hand in hand with such talk are grounded in our mutual understanding, which is itself the product of a common evolutionary heritage.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § LLMs and the Intentional Stance

    A bare-bones LLM has no notion of truth or falsehood and cannot be sensitive to the truth of the sequences it predicts.

    “The model itself has no notion of truth or falsehood because it lacks the means to exercise these concepts in anything like the way we do.”
    • Also stated in: § Do LLMs Really Know Anything? · plain
      “The internal mechanisms it uses to do this, whatever they are, cannot in themselves be sensitive to the truth or otherwise of the word sequences it predicts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    The basic function of an LLM-generating statistically likely continuations-is extraordinarily versatile.

    “the basic function of an LLM, namely to generate statistically likely continuations of word sequences, is extraordinarily versatile.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    A bare-bones LLM is not by itself a conversational agent; it must be embedded in a larger system to manage turn-taking and be prompted to produce conversation-like behavior.

    “a bare-bones LLM is, by itself, not a conversational agent.d For a start, the LLM must be embedded in a larger system to manage the turn-taking in the dialog.But it will also need to be coaxed into producing conversation-like behavior.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Premisereasoning
    § External Information Sources

    A belief about the shared world requires the capacity to revise it when evidence from that world warrants.

    “Nothing can count as a belief about the world we share-in the largest sense of the term-unless it is against the backdrop of the ability to update beliefs appropriately in light of the evidence from that world, an essential aspect of the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Embodiment?

    An isolated LLM cannot triangulate on objective reality, but when embedded in a larger system that interacts with an external world, it becomes more human-like than a disembodied language model.

    “In isolation, an LLM is not the sort of thing that can do this, but in application, LLMs are embedded in larger systems.”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · plain
      “When such a system inhabits a world like our own-a world populated with 3D objects, some of which are other agents, some of whom are language-users-it is, in this important respect, a lot more human-like than a disembodied language model.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § LLMs and the Intentional Stance

    A simple LLM-based question-answering system such as BOT does not have beliefs or knowledge.

    “a simple LLM-based question-answering system like BOT does not, properly speaking, have beliefs.”
    • Also stated in: § LLMs and the Intentional Stance · plain
      “BOT does not really know that Burundi is south of Rwanda”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    Belief in its fullest sense can be ascribed only when a system can distinguish truth from falsehood.

    “Only in the context of a capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood can we legitimately speak of belief in its fullest sense.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    A bare-bones LLM has no access to external reality against which its words might be measured, nor means to apply external criteria of truth.

    “the LLM itself has no access to any external reality against which its words might be measured, nor the means to apply any other external criteria of truth, such as agreement with other language users.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation
    § What LLMs Do and How They Work

    Anthropomorphic language about artifacts is harmless when understood as shorthand via the intentional stance.

    “These examples of what Dennett calls the intentional stance are harmless and useful forms of shorthand for complex processes whose details we don't know or care about.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [11] 11. OpenAI. GPT-4 technical report. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774 (2023). source
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Emergence?

    A dialog system's access to external information sources can confer a form of access to external reality, making the word 'belief' less misleading because it could seek evidence and change its mind.

    “the ability to consult external information sources does indeed confer on a dialog system a form of access to an external reality against which its words can be measured.Used in this context, the word”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Embodiment?

    In chain-of-thought prompting, the token sequences most likely to follow the prompt prefix resemble the prefix and include multiple reasoning steps, so the model generates them.

    “The sequences of tokens most likely to follow S will have a similar form to sequences found in the prompt prefix, which is to say they will include multiple steps of reasoning, so these are what the model generates.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Abstract

    AI systems operate in ways fundamentally different from humans.

    “they work in ways that are fundamentally different than the way humans work.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § External Information Sources

    The shift from the language model itself to the larger system is crucial; the language model remains a sequence predictor with no more access to the external world.

    “this line of thinking depends on the shift from the language model itself to the larger system of which the language model is a part.The language model itself is still just a sequence predictor and has no more access to the external world than it ever did.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Embodiment?

    Non-trivial reasoning problems require multiple inference steps, and LLMs can be applied to multi-step reasoning without further training through prompt engineering.

    “But non-trivial reasoning problems require multiple inference steps.LLMs can be effectively applied to multi-step reasoning, without further training, thanks to clever prompt engineering.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § What about Embodiment?

    Because logic is content neutral, one cannot criticize talk of reasoning in LLMs on the grounds that they lack access to an external reality against which truth or falsehood can be measured.

    “The content neutrality of logic means that we cannot criticize talk of reasoning in LLMs on the grounds that they have no access to an external reality against which truth or falsehood can be measured.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § What about Embodiment?

    A suitably prompted LLM often produces multi-step arguments that are valid and final answers that are correct, but when it appears to reason correctly it does so by mimicking well-formed arguments in its training set and/or prompt.

    “It is remarkable that, not only do the model's responses take the form of an argument with multiple steps, but also the argument in question is often (but not always) valid, and the final answer is often (but not always) correct.”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · hedged
      “But to the extent that a suitably prompted LLM appears to reason correctly, it does so by mimicking well-formed arguments in its training set and/or in the prompt.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    The idea of a whole dialog system having beliefs is not a category error, but a simple dialog agent like BOT still lacks beliefs.

    “At least the very idea of the whole system having beliefs makes sense.There is no category error here.However, for a simple dialog agent like BOT, the answer is surely still”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Do LLMs Really Know Anything?

    Neither an encyclopedia nor a bare-bones LLM literally knows or believes anything in the way a human does.

    “An encyclopedia does not literally”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Embodiment?

    Humans are fundamentally different from LLMs because humans belong to a shared-world community of language users.

    “Humans are members of a community of language users inhabiting a shared world, and this primal fact makes them essentially different than LLMs.”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · plain
      “Human language users can consult the world to settle their disagreements and update their beliefs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Human language users can consult the world to settle disagreements and update beliefs.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Embodiment?

    Whether it is appropriate to attribute communicative intent, knowledge, or belief to an embodied LLM system depends on how the system works, what model it uses, and how the model is embedded in the architecture.

    “But whether it is appropriate to speak of communicative intent in the context of such a system, or of knowledge and belief in their fullest sense, depends”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · plain
      “Whether these concerns apply to any specific VLM-based system depends on exactly how that system works, what sort of model it uses, and how that model is embedded in the system's overall architecture.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Conclusion: Why This Matters

    Contemporary LLM-based conversational agents can create a compelling illusion of a thinking creature, but they are fundamentally not like humans and can be inscrutable, presenting a patchwork of less-than-human and superhuman capacities.

    “Interacting with a contemporary LLM-based conversational agent can create a compelling illusion of being in the presence of a thinking creature like us.Yet, in their very nature, such systems are fundamentally not like us.The shared”
    • Also stated in: § Conclusion: Why This Matters · plain
      “form of life”
    • Also stated in: § Conclusion: Why This Matters · plain
      “that underlies mutual understanding and trust among humans is absent, and these systems can be inscrutable as a result, presenting a patchwork of less-than-human with superhuman capacities, of uncannily human-like with peculiarly inhuman behavior.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The form of life shared by humans, which supports mutual understanding and trust, is missing in LLM-based systems.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § What about Embodiment?

    In SayCan, the LLM's natural-language descriptions of low-level actions are grounded by serving as intermediaries between perception and action, but language learning and use in SayCan is very different from human language because the models are pre-trained on text-only data in a disembodied setting and have not learned language through interaction in a shared world.

    “Nevertheless, despite being physically embodied and interacting with the real world, the way language is learned and used in a system such as SayCan is very different from the way it is learned and used by a human.”
    • Also stated in: § What about Embodiment? · plain
      “Language models incorporated in systems such as SayCan are pre-trained to perform sequence prediction in a disembodied setting from a text-only dataset.They have not learned language by talking to other language users while immersed in a shared world and engaged in joint activity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ahn et al. 1

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § What about Embodiment?

    In embodied systems today, the role of language is very limited: users issue natural-language instructions and systems generate interpretable descriptions of actions, which hardly compares to the range of collective activity language supports in humans.

    “But in such systems today, the role of language is very limited.The user issues instructions to the system in natural language, and the system generates interpretable natural-language descriptions of its actions.But this tiny repertoire of language use hardly bears comparison to the cornucopia of collective activity that language supports in humans.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Can Language Models Reason?

    Because of the prevalence of a common meta-pattern in the published human language corpus, token-level pattern completion often yields the most likely continuation in few-shot prompting, and chain-of-thought prompts transform reasoning problems into next-token prediction problems solvable by pattern completion.

    “This is an example of a common meta-pattern in the published humanlanguage corpus: a series of sequences of tokens, wherein each sequence conforms to the same pattern.”
    • Also stated in: § Can Language Models Reason? · plain
      “Similarly, in the context of a suitable chain-of-thoughtstyle prompt, reasoning problems are transformed into next-token prediction problems, which can be solved by pattern completion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: A common meta-pattern exists in the published human language corpus: token sequences that each conform to one pattern.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Conclusion: Why This Matters

    Careless use of philosophically loaded words such as

    “The careless use of philosophically loaded words such as”
    • Also stated in: § External Information Sources · plain
      “believes”
    • Also stated in: § Conclusion: Why This Matters · plain
      “thinks”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § How Do LLMs Generalize?

    Next-token prediction is sufficient for solving previously unseen reasoning problems, even if unreliably, because an LLM models a complex distribution and samples from it rather than cutting and pasting text fragments.

    “The noteworthy thing is that next-token prediction is sufficient for solving previously unseen reasoning problems, even if unreliably.”
    • Also stated in: § How Do LLMs Generalize? · plain
      “Rather, an LLM models a distribution that is unimaginably complex and allows users and applications to sample from that distribution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § How Do LLMs Generalize?

    A base LLM can be thought of as equivalent to a model trained from scratch with RLHF, in the limit of astronomical raters and training time; this thought experiment shows that what counts most for an LLM's functionality is the nature of the final product rather than the process by which it is produced.

    “Conversely, in the limit, we can think of a conventionally trained base LLM as equivalent to a model trained completely from scratch with RLHF.”
    • Also stated in: § How Do LLMs Generalize? · plain
      “But the thought experiment illustrates that what counts most when we think about the functionality of an LLM is not so much the process by which it is produced (although this is important) but the nature of the final product.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Can Language Models Reason?

    Few-shot prompting does not teach an LLM how to reason; rather, the LLM performs pattern completion, completing a partial sequence that conforms to the pattern of the prompt.

    “It is tempting to say that the few-shot prompt teaches the LLM how to reason, but this would be a misleading characterization.What the LLM does is more accurately described in terms of pattern completion.”
    • Also stated in: § Can Language Models Reason? · hedged
      “The most likely continuation of this partial sequence in the context of the few-shot prompt is a sequence that completes the pattern.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Can Language Models Reason?

    The answer to whether LLM-based systems really have beliefs is usually no.

    “While the answer to the question”
    • Also stated in: § Can Language Models Reason? · plain
      “Do LLM-based systems really have beliefs?”
    • Also stated in: § Can Language Models Reason? · hedged
      “is usually”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
40 of 40
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Anthropomorphic descriptions of LLM-based dialog agents can cause users and developers to misjudge their capabilities.

    “As LLMs become more powerful, it becomes increasingly tempting to describe LLM-based dialog agents in human-like terms, which can lead users to overestimate (or underestimate) their capabilities.”
    “One danger of anthropomorphism is that it can mislead users and developers alike to expect an AI system to exhibit human-level performance on tasks where it in fact cannot match humans, while exhibiting merely research human-level competence on other tasks where it can in fact outperform humans.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Human language users can consult the world to settle disagreements and update beliefs.

    “Human language users can consult the world to settle their disagreements and update their beliefs.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The relationship between the world shared by humans and human words is causal.

    “Importantly, the former relationship is mere correlation, while the latter is causal.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Most contemporary VLM-based systems rely on frozen models that capture the joint distribution of text and images.

    “However, most contemporar y VLM-based systems do not work this way.Rather, they depend on frozen models of the joint distribution of text and images.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Published human text contains many examples of reasoning problems with correct answers.

    “because the vast corpus of published human text contains numerous examples of reasoning problems accompanied by correct answers”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A common meta-pattern exists in the published human language corpus: token sequences that each conform to one pattern.

    “This is an example of a common meta-pattern in the published humanlanguage corpus: a series of sequences of tokens, wherein each sequence conforms to the same pattern.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The form of life shared by humans, which supports mutual understanding and trust, is missing in LLM-based systems.

    “The shared”
    “form of life”
    “that underlies mutual understanding and trust among humans is absent”
7 of 7

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • LLMs exhibit an inherent brittleness and unreliability in knowledge tasks, and struggle with real-world understanding and human-like reasoning tasks.

    “While a growing number of studies have shown that LLMs exhibit an inherent brittleness (13) and unreliability (14, 15) in knowledge tasks, and that they struggle with real-world understanding (11, 16) and human-like reasoning tasks (9, 10, 14), others have shown that LLMs instead excel in mimicking human language and communicative abilities (17)”

    From The benefits and dangers of anthropomorphic conversational agents (2025) · cites this paper as [16]

    For the portions citing this paper, “How Do LLMs Generalize?” says LLMs can solve reasoning problems, but somewhat unreliably; “Can Language Models Reason?” likewise notes occasional mistakes and cautions against characterizing their output as reasoning in the human sense. “Do LLMs Really Know Anything?” questions whether a basic question-answering system can assess truth against external reality, but the passages do not establish unreliability in knowledge tasks as a measured finding. The other parts of the citing sentence have different citations. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Anthropomorphic abilities bring with them the potential for deception and manipulation at scale and for mistaken beliefs by users that these machines understand human experience and existence in ways they cannot.

    “This brings with it the potential for deception and manipulation at scale and for mistaken beliefs by users that these machines understand human experience and existence in ways they cannot (16, 33).”

    From The benefits and dangers of anthropomorphic conversational agents (2025) · cites this paper as [16]

    The Abstract says anthropomorphism can mislead users into attributing capabilities to AI systems that they lack. The Conclusion: Why This Matters says conversational agents can create an illusion of a thinking creature like us, although they lack the shared human experience underlying mutual understanding. Our copy does not establish the separate claim about deception and manipulation at scale. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In media discourse, AI chatbots are frequently described using psychological language and conversational norms in human-AI interaction invite treating chatbots as social agents.

    “Since in media discourse, AI chatbots are frequently described using psychological language and conversational norms in human-AI interaction invite treating chatbots as social agents (Shanahan, 2024), in surveys, this may make consciousness attributions to chatbots seem like the expected or 'correct' response.”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Shanahan, 2024

    The Conclusion: Why This Matters says that words such as “believes” and “thinks” encourage anthropomorphism, including when speaking to the media, and that interacting with a conversational agent can create the illusion of a thinking creature. It does not establish that media descriptions frequently use such language or specifically attribute the effect to conversational norms. The available passage has no reliable page number. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • A generative system supplies the signals of credibility while bypassing the process that those signals are meant to indicate.

    “A generative system thus supplies the signals of credibility while bypassing the process that, in the classroom and in inquiry generally, those signals are meant to indicate [2,45].”
  • Calls cautioning against anthropomorphizing LLMs and AI systems are not new.

    “Calls that caution against researchers, the media or the general public anthropomorphizing LLMs and AI systems are not new (16, 28).”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Marcus, G. and Davis, E. GPT-3, bloviator: OpenAI's language generator has no idea what it's talking about. MIT Technology Rev. (Aug. 2020).
  2. Ruane, E., Birhane, A. and Ventresque, A. Conversational AI: Social and ethical considerations. In Proceedings of the 27th AIAI Irish Conf. on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science (2019), 104--115.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Shanahan, M.
Affiliations
Imperial College London (GB)
Corresponding author
Shanahan, Murray
Venue
Communications of the ACM
Published
2024-01-25
Volume
67
Issue
2
Pages
68-79
ISSN
  • 0001-0782 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7317
OpenAlex
W4391215636
Cited by
381
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 156 · 2025: 147 · 2024: 69 · 2023: 9
FWCI
175.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Communications of the ACM (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Speech and dialogue systems
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
large language models, chatbots, artificial intelligence, human-AI interaction, anthropomorphism, machine cognition

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-09-28.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-09-28.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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