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Cited by 2,175Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsAccounting and Organizational Management

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

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Gneezy, Uri, Rustichini, Aldo·2000·Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/003355300554917
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Abstract

Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test these contrasting claims. We found that the effect of monetary compensation on performance was not monotonic. In the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a higher performance. However, offering money did not always produce an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Several possible interpretations of the results are discussed.

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Crossref · 10.1162/003355300554917

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43 of 43 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Bewley T., 1995, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 250
  2. 10.2307/1170677 · DOI · Paper page
  3. - Intrinsic Motivation (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1975).
  4. 10.1037/0003-066X.51.11.1153 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Fehr E., 1996, Econometrica, 833

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Metadata

Authors
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A.
Affiliations
Boston University (US)
ORCID
Rustichini, Aldo
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2000-08
Volume
115
Issue
3
Pages
791-810
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/003355300554917
OpenAlex
W2168112513
Cited by
2,175
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 61 · 2025: 67 · 2024: 70 · 2023: 127 · 2022: 78 · 2021: 126 · 2020: 93 · 2019: 111 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 119 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 140 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 129 · 2012: 109
FWCI
57.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
Keywords
financial incentives, financial compensation, performance, incentive effects, non-monetary incentives, non-monotonic effects

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