The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Abstract
Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test these contrasting claims. We found that the effect of monetary compensation on performance was not monotonic. In the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a higher performance. However, offering money did not always produce an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Several possible interpretations of the results are discussed.
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“Financial rewards can weaken or even reverse the behaviors ' social signals, because rewards may create doubt about why the person engaged in the action and decrease both motivation and actual behavior (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).”
From Unintended reward costs: the effectiveness of customer referral reward programs for innovative products and services (2019) · cites this paper as Gneezy and Rustichini 2000
Citations
Cites
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger, L. (1957) · doi:10.1515/9781503620766 · Cited by 24,241 · cited 2×
“Another explanation was provided along the lines of Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (see Festinger, 1957 ).”
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Morvan, C., & O’Connor, A. (2017) · Macat Library eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781912282432 · Cited by 18,284
The psychology of interpersonal relations
Heider, F. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089062 · Cited by 17,189
The psychology of interpersonal relations.
Heider, F. (1958) · doi:10.1037/10628-000 · Cited by 13,457
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Moffitt, R. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,888
Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.
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Feshbach, S., & Jones, M. R. (1957) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1419253 · Cited by 3,842
(1967) · Cited by 3,831
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885099 · Cited by 3,210
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Bewley T., 1995, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 250
- 10.2307/1170677 · DOI · Paper page
- - Intrinsic Motivation (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1975).
- 10.1037/0003-066X.51.11.1153 · DOI · Paper page
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review
Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206306294258 · Cited by 1,837
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior
Uri Gneezy, B., Meier, S., & Rey‐Biel, P. (2011) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.4.191 · Cited by 1,797
Metadata
- Authors
- Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- ORCID
- Rustichini, Aldo
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-08
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 791-810
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2168112513
- Cited by
- 2,175
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 61 · 2025: 67 · 2024: 70 · 2023: 127 · 2022: 78 · 2021: 126 · 2020: 93 · 2019: 111 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 119 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 140 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 129 · 2012: 109
- FWCI
- 57.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- Research portal (Tilburg University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
- Keywords
- financial incentives, financial compensation, performance, incentive effects, non-monetary incentives, non-monotonic effects
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