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Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
Open accessAbstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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Breslin, S. G., & Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2023) · The Pacific Review · doi:10.1080/09512748.2023.2200030 · Cited by 54
“Such a fear that others might ‘weaponize [asymmetric] independence’ (Farrell & Newman, 2019) can create insecurity even if nothing has yet been done, as insecurity is often based on perceptions (and lack of trust of ) future actions rather than a direct response to concrete past action.”
BackgroundNaïve no more: Foreign direct investment screening in the European Union
Danzman, S. B., & Meunier, S. (2023) · Global Policy · doi:10.1111/1758-5899.13215 · Cited by 49
Aydın‐Düzgit, S., Kutlay, M., & Keyman, E. F. (2025) · International Politics · doi:10.1057/s41311-024-00638-w · Cited by 42
The EU’s Turn to ‘Strategic Autonomy’: Leeway for Policy Action and Points of Conflict
Steinbach, A. (2023) · European Journal of International Law · doi:10.1093/ejil/chad048 · Cited by 58
European Digital Sovereignty: A Layered Approach
Sheikh, H. I. (2022) · Digital Society · doi:10.1007/s44206-022-00025-z · Cited by 64
“They discern a panop-ticon effect and a chokepoint effect through which other countries can be monitored and pressured respectively (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundThe EU as a Geoeconomic Actor? A Review of Recent European Trade and Investment Policies
Weinhardt, C., Mau, K., & Pohl, J. H. (2022) · International political economy series · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01968-5_5 · Cited by 45
Five modes of China’s economic influence: rethinking Chinese economic statecraft
Ferchen, M., & Mattlin, M. (2023) · The Pacific Review · doi:10.1080/09512748.2023.2200029 · Cited by 45
Cross-Network Weaponization in the Semiconductor Supply Chain
Beaumier, G., & Cartwright, M. (2023) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqae003 · Cited by 77
Subversion, cyber operations, and reverse structural power in world politics
Maschmeyer, L. (2022) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/13540661221117051 · Cited by 49
“…Internet in line with American norms and interests (Betz and Stevens, 2011: 49–50; Carr, 2016: 71–76; McCarthy, 2015: 98–100), its resulting central structural position in information networks (Farrell and Newman, 2019), and its dominant position within global security structures (Winecoff, 2020).”
BackgroundSuccess of economic sanctions threats: coercion, information and commitment
Walentek, D., Broere, J., Cinelli, M., Dekker, M., & Haslbeck, J. M. B. (2021) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2021.1860034 · Cited by 52
“…security variable on issue type information provided by the authors of the TIES data set.19 In addition, given its dominant position in the global economy and foreign policy power (Farrell and Newman 2019; Haas 1997; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008), we control for the role of the US as a sender.”
BackgroundResultPoverty Narratives and Power Paradoxes in International Trade Negotiations and Beyond
Narlikar, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108234191 · Cited by 40
Mariotti, S. (2024) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-024-00327-y · Cited by 75
“The "weaponiza-tion of interdependencies" for coercive purposes (Farrell & Newman, 2019) extends to virtually all areas—economic policies, energy, global value chains, migration, media, medicine, sports, and more—within an expanded concept of hybrid warfare (Hoffman, 2007).”
Geostrategic globalization: US–China rivalry, corporate strategy, and the new global economy
Schindler, S., & Rolf, S. (2024) · Globalizations · doi:10.1080/14747731.2024.2434306 · Cited by 61
“…century such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, digital platforms, networks are increasingly leveraged by states for geostrategic ends (Farrell & Newman, 2019; 2023; Gertz & Evers, 2020), others have called for analyses that problematize states’ growing dependence on private economic…”
Hidden Exposure: Measuring US Supply Chain Reliance
Baldwin, R., Freeman, R., & Theodorakopoulos, A. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31820 · Cited by 38
The US–China Chip War, Economy–Security Nexus, and Asia
Kim, Y., & Rho, S. (2024) · Journal of Chinese Political Science · doi:10.1007/s11366-024-09881-7 · Cited by 37
“However, strengthened economic dependence creates asymmetric economic networks, which in turn result in the possibility of weaponizing interdependence for states with more networks [24].”
Wang, X., Chen, B., Hou, N., & Chi, Z. (2024) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2024.02.008 · Cited by 39
Foreign investment screening mechanisms and emergent geographies of (post)globalization
Alami, I. (2024) · Dialogues in Human Geography · doi:10.1177/20438206241278733 · Cited by 39
“Commentators refer to this as the ‘ securitization of economic policy ’ (Vidigal and Schill, 2021), the emergence of a ‘ geoeconomic world order ’ (Babic ́ et al., 2022), or the ‘ weaponization of economic inter-dependence ’ (Farrell and Newman, 2019).”
Navigating industrial policy and global value chains in an era of disruptions
Gereffi, G., Pananond, P., Tell, F., & Fang, T. (2025) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-025-00223-9 · Cited by 62
“The theme of “weaponized interdependence” (Farrell & Newman, 2019) validates our framework’s emphasis on the security-embedded governance structures that characterize the fragmentation era.”
Proedrou, F. (2023) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su15065083 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
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