Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
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Abstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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“In parallel, the United States weaponized global supply chains through denying or threatening to deny the sale of key components to Chinese competitors, such as semiconductors to Huawei, as well as to those producing semiconductors for Huawei in third countries (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
Zeitenwende | Wendezeiten: Sonderausgabe des Munich Security Report
Bunde, T., Hartmann, L., Stärk, F., Carr, R., Erber, C., Hammelehle, J., & Kabus, J. (2020) · doi:10.47342/ysuc7634 · Cited by 4
Is COVID-Era Assertiveness in Chinese Foreign Policy Novel?
Raman, G. V., & Mukherjee, B. (2021) · China Report · doi:10.1177/00094455211047068 · Cited by 4
US Trade Policy: Japan vs. China, from Politically Economic to Existential
Kerremans, B. (2022) · The European Union in international affairs · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-81281-2_3 · Cited by 4
The geopolitical economy of state-led intelligence-commerce: two examples from Iraq and West Germany
Hoffmann, S. (2022) · Globalizations · doi:10.1080/14747731.2022.2075527 · Cited by 4
Prepping for Long-Term Competition? U.S. Leadership in Cyberspace from Trump to Biden
Douzet, F., & Taillat, S. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-10260-8_12 · Cited by 4
War, Sanctions, Deglobalization: Which Comes First?
Brancaccio, E., & Califano, A. (2023) · Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional · doi:10.1590/0034-7329202300104 · Cited by 4
Gatekeeper’s Dilemma: Japan Facing CPTPP Applications from China and Taiwan
Katada, S. N. (2023) · Taiwan and world affairs · doi:10.1007/978-981-99-3197-2_7 · Cited by 4
Financial regulatory conundrums in the North Atlantic
Posner, E., & Quaglia, L. (2023) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12616 · Cited by 4
“The main causal mechanism featured in this study is an international feedback that arose from internal US and EU developments (Farrell & Newman, 2019a, 2019b; Newman & Posner, 2018).”
Arming Fortress Europe? Spaces and Instruments of Economic Patriotism in EU Armament Policy
Hoeffler, C. (2023) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.v11i4.7231 · Cited by 4
“Currently, policymakers increasingly see interdependence as a cause of vulnerability because dependence on foreign actors is considered less reliable (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundRace for Nanometers: American Policy Toward Taiwan and Republic of Korea
Данилин, И. В., & Selyanin, Y. V. (2023) · World Economy and International Relations · doi:10.20542/0131-2227-2023-67-11-80-88 · Cited by 4
Geopolitics and International Trade
Barbieri, K. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-47227-5_49 · Cited by 7
Londoño, C. R. B. (2021) · NULLIUS Revista de pensamiento crítico en el ámbito del Derecho · doi:10.33936/revistaderechos.v2i2.4075 · Cited by 4
“…como aquello que impone restricciones objetivas a los actores, para afirmar que las redes económicas globales presentan una topografía asimétrica por la cual los flujos correrían por unos pocos nodos intermedios centralizando el intercambio con el paso del tiempo (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
InfluentialSchlee, R., & Opper, J. (2020) · New Perspectives · doi:10.1177/2336825x20935233 · Cited by 4
“Entanglement proved to be a double-edged sword as the openness of societies, even in strictly commercial terms, presented vulnerabilities that were exploited quickly – as well as opportunities to exploit (Farrell and Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundThe EU’s CFSP/CSDP in 2030: Towards an alternative vision of power?
Baciu, C., & Friede, A. M. (2020) · New Perspectives · doi:10.1177/2336825x20935245 · Cited by 4
“Asymmetric interdependencies between global players, which make massive investments abroad, and European states are weaponized (cf. Farrell and Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundAvant, D. (2020) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viaa069 · Cited by 4
The Geopolitics of the Data-Driven EconomyPreprint
Ciuriak, D. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3770470 · Cited by 8
Lyseiuk, A. (2026) · Politics & Security · doi:10.54658/ps.28153324.2025.14.4.pp.6-15 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.