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Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
Open accessAbstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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Nachum, L. (2021) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-021-00105-w · Cited by 19
Mattlin, M., & Rajavuori, M. (2023) · East Asia · doi:10.1007/s12140-023-09397-6 · Cited by 16
Contentious Connectivity—the USA, Japan, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Gaens, B., & Sinkkonen, V. (2023) · East Asia · doi:10.1007/s12140-023-09407-7 · Cited by 16
Park, S. A. (2023) · Asia and the Global Economy · doi:10.1016/j.aglobe.2023.100063 · Cited by 19
Commercial Casualties: Political Boycotts and International Disputes
Weiss, J. C., Jia, P., Li, S., & Wallace, J. (2019) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/jea.2023.19 · Cited by 29
“…ties may serve less as a “ shock absorber ” (Davis and Meunier 2011, 632) than a conduit for signals of resolve (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001), perhaps akin to that argued under the expansive term “ weaponized interdependence ” (Farrell and Newman 2019; Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013; Kastner 2016).”
Law and the political economy of AI production
Terzis, P. (2023) · International Journal of Law and Information Technology · doi:10.1093/ijlit/eaae001 · Cited by 20
Inside the European Union's Trade Machinery: Institutional Changes in an Age of Geoeconomics
Couvreur, S. (2024) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.13625 · Cited by 19
The Geoeconomic Turn in EU Trade and Investment Policy: Implications for Developing Countries
Weinhardt, C., & Ville, F. D. (2024) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.8217 · Cited by 18
“While existing literature on the geoeconomic turn initially focused on US–China relations (Farrell & Newman, 2019), scholarship on the EU’s role in a geoeconomic context is on the rise (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2019; Weinhardt et al., 2022).”
BackgroundChina’s perception of minilateralism and Chinese-style multilateralism
Wu, X., & Kim, D. (2024) · Australian Journal Of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/10357718.2024.2409969 · Cited by 16
“In the economic realm, the U.K.’s oscillation over Huawei’s 5G network role—initially embracing it due to economic imperatives but later renouncing it under U.S. duress—exemplifies this dynamic (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
Modi’s India and Japan: nested strategic partnerships
Basrur, R. M., & Kutty, S. N. (2021) · International Politics · doi:10.1057/s41311-021-00288-2 · Cited by 16
The geopolitics of supply chains: EU efforts to ensure security of supply
Glencross, A. R. (2024) · Global Policy · doi:10.1111/1758-5899.13388 · Cited by 15
Sinkkonen, E., & Lassila, J. (2022) · Global power shift · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3_9 · Cited by 15
When are International Organizations Responsive to Policy Problems?
Lundgren, M., Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., & Squatrito, T. (2023) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqad045 · Cited by 15
Torjesen, S. (2023) · The Extractive Industries and Society · doi:10.1016/j.exis.2023.101375 · Cited by 16
Doppen, F., Calcara, A., & Biévre, D. D. (2024) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2024.2368601 · Cited by 15
“Third, our paper engages in a complementary dialogue with scholarship on the role of state authority in the global economy (Milner, 2021), the structural power of firms (Culpepper & Thelen, 2020; Malkin, 2022), and weaponized interdependence (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundKöncke, P., & de Graaff, N. (2024) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.8195 · Cited by 18
“…“de‐risking” by reducing its economic dependencies vis‐à‐vis China (European Commission, 2023a), driven by a (perceived) threat that the Chinese party‐state could make use of strong economic ties and dependencies for exploiting opportunities of “weaponized interdependence” (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundSchmalz, S. (2024) · Critical Sociology · doi:10.1177/08969205241291645 · Cited by 21
Taiwan and the Danger of a Sino-American War
Chan, S. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009589543 · Cited by 21
Regaining relevance: IPE and a changing global political economy
Oatley, T. H. (2021) · Cambridge Review of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/09557571.2021.1888880 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
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