Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
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Abstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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“Their goal was to diminish Chinese economic and technological capabilities and protect the US from the weaponisation of interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
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Svetlicinii, A. (2022) · Journal of International Trade Law and Policy · doi:10.1108/jitlp-09-2021-0048 · Cited by 10
Kotilainen, K., & Patomäki, H. (2022) · Global Political Economy · doi:10.1332/jifq7497 · Cited by 11
Virtual water, international relations and the new geopolitics of food
Woertz, E. (2022) · Water International · doi:10.1080/02508060.2022.2134516 · Cited by 16
“Farrell and Newman (2019) have argued that weaponized interdependence enables states that control global economic hubs to exert power over others.”
BackgroundВытеснение Российского Севера: исключение без права на ресурсы
Lytkina, T., Ярошенко, С. С., & Ярошенко, С. С. (2023) · Journal of Economic Sociology · doi:10.17323/1726-3247-2023-5-93-127 · Cited by 19
From BRICS to BRICS+: Sheer More Members is not a Challenge to G7
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The Geoeconomics of the Single Market for Financial Services
Quaglia, L., & Verdun, A. (2024) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.13595 · Cited by 16
The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Studies
Shei, C., & Wei, W. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429059704 · Cited by 11
Why Thucydides’ Trap Misinforms Sino-American Relations
Chan, S. (2021) · Vestnik RUDN International Relations · doi:10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-2-232-242 · Cited by 9
Gui, Y. (2022) · China International Strategy Review · doi:10.1007/s42533-022-00097-z · Cited by 9
“The two scholars call this power relationship “weaponized interdependence,” which includes two 59 1 3 China International Strategy Review (2022) 4:55–73 effects: panopticon and chokepoint (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
BackgroundТеоретизируя цифровые платформы: концептуальная схема для гиг-экономики
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Brothers in arms: the value of coalitions in sanctions regimes
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“…a multicausal set of conditions, encompassing factors such as the salience of the defiant situation (Dobson 2002; Vihma, 2018, Baracuhy, 2019), the sender ’ s bureaucratic capabilities, as well as its reputational and economic costs (Farrell and Newman 2019; Blackwill and Harris 2016; Zhang 2019).”
The US-China race for technological centrality: A network perspective
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Critical approaches to geoeconomics: Taiwan’s position/ing in the global chip war
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“…thinking aiming at re-engaging the (post)neoliberal global economy is demonstrated in the prevalence of the ‘weaponized interdependence’ thesis (Farrell and Newman, 2019), which draws on network theory to re-interpret the strategic implications of the (neo) liberal economic order dictated by…”
Norway in the geopolitics of energy
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Escaping a weaponized network: China’s reaction to the United States escalating technology controls
Woods, D. (2025) · Asian Review of Political Economy · doi:10.1007/s44216-025-00047-7 · Cited by 9
“According to Farrell and Newman (2019, 42) “highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective juris-diction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends.”
InfluentialWall Street in China: the malleability of global finance in the age of geopolitics
Petry, J. (2025) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2025.2488307 · Cited by 11
“This setup has also enabled the weaponisation of finance for US policy objectives (Farrell & Newman, 2019; McDowell, 2023).”
Defining economic security through literature review
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New economic statecraft and global technology conflicts: the dilemma for middle powers
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“This reflects what Farrell and Newman (2019) term “ weaponized interdependence, ” wherein states exploit positions in global networks to pressure rivals.”
The European Union in a Geo‐Economic World: Towards a New Inter‐Institutional Balance?
Conzelmann, T., & Vanhoonacker, S. (2025) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.13774 · Cited by 9
Jacobsen, J. T., & Liebetrau, T. (2025) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/13540661251370265 · Cited by 9
“Approaching infrastructural agency in this way, enables a move from seeing infrastructures as passive sites for public and private actors to exploit (Abels, 2024; Farrell and Newman, 2019; Petry, 2023), to empirical explorations of modes of infrastructural mediation of public-private relations.”
Munich Security Report 2022: Breaking the Tide – Unlearning Helplessness
Bunde, T., Eisentraut, S., Knapp, N., Carr, R., Hammelehle, J., Kump, I., & Miehe, L. (2022) · doi:10.47342/qawu4724 · Cited by 9
French presidents and the discursive use of European Sovereignty: more than a metaphor
Bora, S. I., & Lequesne, C. (2023) · Journal of European Integration · doi:10.1080/07036337.2023.2212318 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
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