Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 119 of the 123 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
2 more claims about this paper
Create a free account to see every claim other papers make about this one.
Citations
Cites
Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
Barabási, A.-L., & Albert, R. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.286.5439.509 · Cited by 36,135
Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data
Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R., & Newman, M. E. J. (2009) · SIAM Review · doi:10.1137/070710111 · Cited by 8,019
Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events
Arthur, W. B. (1989) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234208 · Cited by 7,489
Power-law distributions in empirical data
Clauset, A. J., Shalizi, C. R., & Newman, M. E. J. (2018) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6586835.v1 · Cited by 6,504
(1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 6,056
(2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.i · Cited by 4,443
Diameter of the World-Wide Web
Albert, R., Jeong, H., & Barabási, A.-L. (1999) · Nature · doi:10.1038/43601 · Cited by 4,260
The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy
Strange, S. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559143 · Cited by 3,339
ON A CLASS OF SKEW DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
SIMON, H. A. (1955) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/42.3-4.425 · Cited by 2,771
Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434
Padgett, J. F., & Ansell, C. K. (1993) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/230190 · Cited by 2,276
Research works printed but not linked: 21
- Kittrie Orde F., 2009, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 30, 789
- Farrell Henry, 2017, Journal of Cybersecurity, 3, 7
- Newman M.E.J., 2003, Physical Review E, 1
- Ting-Fang Cheng, 2018, Nikki Asian Review
- Oatley Thomas, European Journal of International Relations, forthcoming, doi.org/10., 1177
- 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199905)20:5<397::AID-SMJ35>3.0.CO;2-K · DOI · Paper page
- David Paul A., 1985, American Economic Review, 75, 332
- Fagiolo Giorgio, 2009, Physical Review E, 79, 1
- Khan Lina M., 2018, Yale Law Journal Forum, 27, 960
- Khan Lina M., 2017, Yale Law Journal, 126, 710
- Barlow John Perry, 1996, Humanist, 56, 18
- Balkin Jack M., 2008, Pepperdine Law Review, 36, 427
- Caytas Joanna Diane, 2017, Columbia Journal of International Law, 23, 441
- Zarate Juan C., 2013, Hachette, 50
- European Commission, 2017, European Commission, 7
- SWIFT, Annual Review, 2010
- Solomon Jay, 2012, Wall Street Journal
- Rubenfeld Samuel, 2018, Wall Street Journal
- Goldberg Richard, 2018, Wall Street Journal
- Clinton Hillary Rodham, 2010, speech given at the Newseum, Washington, D.C., 2009
- Hirsch Michael, 2013, National Journal
Cited by
Items 301–400 of 1,003
Commerce and Security Meet in the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments
García-Durán, P., Eliasson, L. J., & Costa, O. (2023) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.v11i4.7030 · Cited by 9
“In a situation in which “unprecedented levels of interde‐ pendence” coexist with “continued jockeying for power,” the capacity to “grant or deny access to networks under‐ lies several of the most important contemporary geopo‐ litical competitions” (Farrell & Newman, 2019, p. 43).”
BackgroundTechnological and Economic Decoupling in the Cyber Era
Macia, D. G., & Goyal, R. (2020) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9781513561677.001 · Cited by 9
Jaeger, M. D. (2021) · Swiss Political Science Review · doi:10.1111/spsr.12436 · Cited by 9
Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision
(2023) · doi:10.47342/zbja9198 · Cited by 20
Weaponizing Interdependence & Global Value Chains: US Export Controls on HuaweiPreprint
Fuller, D. B. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4221915 · Cited by 23
Weaponised Citizenship: Should international law restrict oppressive nationality attribution?Preprint
Jain, N. M. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4584093 · Cited by 10
Lehdonvirta, V., Wú, B., & Hawkins, Z. A. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4670764 · Cited by 14
The Geoeconomics of Belt and Road Disputes: A Case Study on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
MCLAUGHLIN, M. (2023) · Asian Journal of International Law · doi:10.1017/s2044251323000176 · Cited by 11
Chan, S. (2023) · Asian Survey · doi:10.1525/as.2023.1999300 · Cited by 8
Analysis of green deal communication on twitter: environmental and political perspective
Balcarová, T., Pilařová, L., Prokop, M., Jadrná, M., Stanislavská, L. K., & Pilař, L. (2024) · Frontiers in Environmental Science · doi:10.3389/fenvs.2024.1370568 · Cited by 12
Who are the green transition experts? Towards a new research agenda on climate change knowledge
Frandsen, S. L., & Hasselbalch, J. (2024) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change · doi:10.1002/wcc.917 · Cited by 14
“This also counts for multinational corporations, which may span across multiple borders but whose headquarters and ultimate influence are embedded in domestic environments under the jurisdiction of states (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Joseph, M. F., & Poznansky, M. (2024) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818324000250 · Cited by 9
“Drezner 2019; Farrell and Newman 2019; N.L. Miller 2022; Taylor 2016.”
Market devices and infrastructures: how they differ and why it matters
Pinzur, D., & Duterme, T. (2025) · Journal of Cultural Economy · doi:10.1080/17530350.2024.2409798 · Cited by 10
Andrijauskas, K., & Boruta, R. (2025) · The International Spectator · doi:10.1080/03932729.2024.2444289 · Cited by 10
Confronting multiple global crises: a political economy approach for the twenty-first century
Bieler, A. (2025) · Globalizations · doi:10.1080/14747731.2025.2453300 · Cited by 9
“Articles will be written about the liberal concept of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane & Nye, 1977), being confronted with the realist notion of ‘weaponized interdependence’ (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Lee, H., & Baek, S. (2025) · Asia Pacific Business Review · doi:10.1080/13602381.2025.2458649 · Cited by 11
Hidden structures of a global infrastructure: Expansion factors of the subsea data cable network
Franken, J., Reinhold, T., Dörnfeld, T., & Reuter, C. (2025) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2025.124068 · Cited by 8
Beyond hedging: understanding India’s polyalignment in the Second Cold War
Magunna, A. (2025) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2025.2511859 · Cited by 8
“They build on the analysis of Farrell and Newman (2019), who argue that economic globalisation has challenged the existence of states as territorially fixed, stable entities – as such, ‘economic globalisation creates its own set of international structures – through global networks – and thus…”
The Power of Withholding: Rare Earth Quotas and Informational Statecraft in China
Woods, D. (2025) · Journal of Chinese Political Science · doi:10.1007/s11366-025-09922-9 · Cited by 10
Curran, L. (2025) · Journal of Economic Geography · doi:10.1093/jeg/lbaf062 · Cited by 9
Heldt, E. C., & Meunier, S. (2026) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2026.2627350 · Cited by 13
“Building on recent work on securitisation (Bauerle Danzman, 2025; Oren-stein, 2025), ‘weaponized interdependence’ (Farrell & Newman, 2019), and geoeconomics (Christou & Damro, 2024; Eckert, 2024; Herranz-Surrallés et al. , 2024), we conceptualise this shift as the emergence of a ‘securitized…”
Sharaf, M. F., Shahen, A. M., Mansour, E. I., & Elboghdadly, N. N. (2026) · International Economics and Economic Policy · doi:10.1007/s10368-026-00732-9 · Cited by 8
Which side are you on? Geoeconomic coercion and German corporate networks in the US–China rivalry
Baines, J., Germann, J., Rolf, S., & Starrs, S. K. (2026) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2026.2622519 · Cited by 9
“…hierarchical structures (e.g., Bauerle Danzman & Meunier, 2024; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Oatley et al., 2013; Winecoff, 2020), comprising nodes that states can use as ‘chokepoints’ or ‘panopticons’ to threaten or surveil rivals in a context of weaponized interdependence (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Manufacturing consensus: China’s strategic narratives and geoeconomic competition in Asia
Lin, A. Y.-T., & Katada, S. N. (2023) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/13540661231219090 · Cited by 8
“Second, if rising powers can attract followers to join these initiatives, they can increase the follower states’ dependence on them, which in turn enhances the rising powers’ influence and ability to weaponize interdependence (Farrell and Newman, 2019).”
Mesquita, R. (2024) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-024-09532-9 · Cited by 8
“Its fit within a network approach was perceived by later scholars, given that this influence over the options available to peers is achieved by controlling key channels and links (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Desmaele, L. (2024) · International Politics · doi:10.1057/s41311-024-00577-6 · Cited by 13
The politics of rejection: Explaining Chinese import refusals
Kim, S. E., Perlman, R., & Zeng, G. (2024) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12883 · Cited by 10
“A substantial literature, for example, has observed how nations might take advantage of trade dependencies in order to coerce their partners (Drezner, 2021; Farrell and Newman, 2019; Drezner, 2009; Abdelal and Kirshner, 1999; Carnegie, 2014; Hirschman, 1980; Keohane and Nye Jr, 1973).”
BackgroundLugo, S., & Montone, M. (2025) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102937 · Cited by 9
Under hegemonic pressure: 2018 American sanctions against Iran and Turkey’s response
Matera, P. (2020) · Digest of Middle East Studies · doi:10.1111/dome.12218 · Cited by 8
Foreign economic policy in the European Parliament and economic interdependence with foreign powers
Norrevik, S. (2021) · European Union Politics · doi:10.1177/14651165211035060 · Cited by 8
“Recent studies show that economic networks are commonly used to coerce other nations, a phenomenon described as weaponised interdependence (Farrell and Newman, 2019).”
BackgroundInfluentialGeopolitics and Hong Kong as international financial centre: a dynamic IPE perspective
Chin, G. (2022) · Asia Pacific Business Review · doi:10.1080/13602381.2022.2127520 · Cited by 8
“…Relations scholars have shown how the Trump administration was particularly avid practitioners of ‘weaponizing interdependence’, and keen to use economic leverage to extract concessions from other nations across a wide array of economic and security fronts (Farrell and Newman 2019; Drezner 2019).”
BackgroundThe Unintended Consequences of Arms Embargoes
Kuo, R. C., & Spindel, J. E. (2022) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1093/fpa/orac030 · Cited by 8
Berthonnet, I., & Bracarense, N. (2022) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2022.2111147 · Cited by 12
“Another possible outcome of the Chinese strategy of filling the space left vacant by the United States’ practice of “weaponizing interdependence” (Farrell and Newman 2019) could be an increased use of the renminbi only in the geopolitical periphery.”
BackgroundThe Economic Coercion Trilemma
Mangini, M. (2023) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231191530 · Cited by 8
“Recent work has studied asymmetric dependence induced by the position of states in networks (Farrell and Newman 2019; Drezner, Farrell, and Newman 2021).”
BackgroundThe three phases of financial power: Leverage, infrastructure, and enforcementPreprint
Braun, B., & Koddenbrock, K. (2022) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/kcwy7 · Cited by 8
(2023) · doi:10.47342/bmqk9457 · Cited by 8
The limits of pressure: China’s bounded economic coercion in response to South Korea’s THAAD
Yeo, Y. (2023) · Australian Journal Of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/10357718.2023.2216642 · Cited by 7
“…unlike the arguments of economic liberals (Shambaugh 1996, 583; Drury 1998, 508; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 2000: Vol 1., 101), economic interdependence has been weaponized by larger states’ pursuit of their own national interests (Farrell and Newman 2019; Drezner, Farrell, and Newman 2021).”
BackgroundTechnological sovereignty in Germany: techno-industrial policy as a form of economic statecraft?
Staab, P., Pirogan, M., & Piétron, D. (2024) · Global Political Economy · doi:10.1332/26352257y2023d000000005 · Cited by 7
Governing Cross-Border Data Flows: Reconciling EU Data Protection and International Trade Law
Yakovleva, S. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192899248.001.0001 · Cited by 17
Polianskii, M. (2024) · Nationalities Papers · doi:10.1017/nps.2024.76 · Cited by 7
“With economic and political globalization creating a dense web of international dependencies, asymmetries are argued to have resulted in numerous “ security consequences, ” and have increasingly been “ weaponized ” (Farrell and Newman, 2019, 2020; Gertz and Evers, 2020).”
Regan, A., & Blyth, M. M. (2025) · Socio-Economic Review · doi:10.1093/ser/mwaf003 · Cited by 8
Rasador, G. S., & Cunha, A. M. (2025) · The Pacific Review · doi:10.1080/09512748.2025.2470222 · Cited by 7
“While it is generally acknowledged that laws and norms could prevent states from intervening in markets (Farrell & Newman, 2019, p. 57), they can be instru-mentalised and often constrained (Ferguson, 2022, p. 24), as they are not neutral mechanisms exercised by a neutral body, but consist of a…”
InfluentialDigital Governance in a Rubber Band: Structural Constraints in Governing a Global Digital Economy
Beaumier, G., & Gjesvik, L. (2025) · Global Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isagsq/ksaf043 · Cited by 13
Buckley, P. J., & Enderwick, P. (2025) · Management International Review · doi:10.1007/s11575-025-00585-5 · Cited by 8
“The global influence of the US in trade, finance, advanced technologies data storage (Farrell & Newman, 2019) and military protection, mean that any substantive policy changes will have spillover effects for the global econ - omy.”
International trade and economic growth in the era of geoeconomic fragmentation
Salvatore, D., & Tripathi, J. S. (2025) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2025.06.017 · Cited by 8
Åberg, J. H. S., & Agbebi, M. (2025) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2025.2546668 · Cited by 11
Sun, J., & Mallard, G. (2025) · Socio-Economic Review · doi:10.1093/ser/mwaf051 · Cited by 10
Assessing external pressures: European integration in the geopolitical age
Freudlsperger, C., & Schramm, L. (2025) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2025.2608177 · Cited by 7
“Such asymmetrical relations, and the differing degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability they imply (Keohane & Nye, 1977/2011), provide opportunities to exploit and ‘weaponize’ the dependencies of others (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Building Bridges or Competing in a Payments Arms Race? The Geopolitics of the mBridge Project
Bouguelli, R., & Conti, B. D. (2026) · International Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1080/08911916.2026.2624895 · Cited by 7
“As Farrell and Newman (2019, 2023) point out, states that control key infrastructures like global payment systems or the internet back-bone can turn them into tools of coercion, thereby weaponizing interdependence.”
USD hegemony, bitcoin, Central Bank Digital Currency and the geopolitics of money
Bibi, S. (2026) · Journal of Post Keynesian Economics · doi:10.1080/01603477.2026.2631648 · Cited by 7
McLean, E. V. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198793519.013.2 · Cited by 10
Das Netz und die Netze. Vom Wandel des Internets und der globalen digitalen Ordnung
Pohle, J., & Voelsen, D. (2022) · Berliner Journal für Soziologie · doi:10.1007/s11609-022-00478-6 · Cited by 7
Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions
Jeong, J. M. (2023) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231154450 · Cited by 7
“This fi nding might be attributed to its unique ability to unilaterally isolate targets from the global economic system and in fl ict severe economic costs by leveraging its central position in global trade and fi nancial networks (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
BackgroundTransnational uncivil society networks: kleptocracy’s global fightback against liberal activism
Cooley, A. A., Heathershaw, J., & de Oliveira, R. S. (2023) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/13540661231186502 · Cited by 10
“Putatively private economic actors serve as the adjuncts and intermediaries of state power, even of the greatest powers (Farrell and Newman, 2019; Grynaviski, 2018; Judge, 2015).”
BackgroundNoneconomic Objectives, Global Value Chains and International Cooperation
Hoekman, B. M., Mavroidis, P. C., & NELSON, D. R. (2023) · Italian Economic Journal · doi:10.1007/s40797-023-00240-8 · Cited by 7
“Some of these assessments have motivated policies to reduce dependence by incentivizing domestic production of products deemed to be important for sustaining autonomy and reducing risks that trading partners might weaponize trade dependence (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
BackgroundThe U.S. Secondary Sanctions Related to Russia: Empirical Analysis
Николаевич, Т. И. (2024) · Comparative Politics Russia · doi:10.46272/2221-3279-2024-1-15-95-114 · Cited by 7
When fear matters: varied foreign economic cooperation preferences in the face of conflict
Bulman, D. J. (2024) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2024.2426605 · Cited by 8
“Integrated global value chains and new technologies in the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ have all heightened the economics-security nexus globally, with new forms of economic interdependence increasingly exhibiting the capacity for weaponization (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Ba, H. (2020) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066120967048 · Cited by 9
“See Farrell and Newman (2019) for a great discussion of how countries are using their posi- tions within international financial and economic networks to achieve their security goals.”
BackgroundRevisiting Insularity and Expansion: A Theory Note
Schuessler, J. M., Shifrinson, J. R. I., & Blagden, D. (2021) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s153759272100222x · Cited by 8
Central Asia Region in China’s Foreign Policy after 2013: A Geoeconomics Study
Aryal, S. K. (2021) · Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1134/s1019331621060149 · Cited by 8
Friedrichs, G. M. (2022) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viac010 · Cited by 11
US Sanctions and Foreign Lobbying of the US Government
Peksen, D., & Peterson, T. M. (2022) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/10659129221098109 · Cited by 10
“We focus on sanctions by the United States because the US occupies a unique position in the international economy, most notably enabled by the centrality of US dollars in international finance (Drezner 2015; Farrell and Newman 2019).”
BackgroundClayton, C., Coppola, A., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2025) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w34020 · Cited by 27
“A recent literature has focused on the idea of “weaponized interdependence” in Farrell and Newman (2019), Drezner et al. (2021), and Farrell and Newman (2023).”
Green Superpowers: China, the European Union, and the United States in the Global Energy Transition
Prontera, A. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191987304.001.0001 · Cited by 10
Ye, X. (2025) · The Pacific Review · doi:10.1080/09512748.2025.2467670 · Cited by 11
“Economic minilateralism is a byproduct of weaponized interdependence in which the hegemonic power uses an asymmetric network structure to exert panopticons and chokepoint effects in cutting connections with the rising power (farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Crespi, F., Cerra, R., & Zezza, F. (2025) · Intereconomics · doi:10.2478/ie-2025-0016 · Cited by 6
Kürzdörfer, N. (2025) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2025.2483371 · Cited by 7
“Farrell and Newman (2019) challenged this assumption by outlining the asymmetric and hierarchical nature of global economic networks, in the course of defining WI. Central actors of the network, hubs, are connected to most or all other actors, nodes.”
InfluentialMoon, J., Xun, S., Chung, J., & Textoris, S. D. (2025) · Resources Policy · doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105726 · Cited by 6
Securitized political economy, investment regulation and business influence in a geoeconomic era
Danzman, S. B. (2025) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/13540661251364402 · Cited by 10
“The capacity to weaponize interdependence depends on states’ ability to press commercial actors into service for the “national interest” (Farrell and Newman, 2019).”
InfluentialZhu, J., Sinkkonen, E., & Mattlin, M. (2025) · Telecommunications Policy · doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2025.103114 · Cited by 9
Structural power redux: geoeconomic rivalry in a networked world
Rolf, S., Zajontz, T., & Schindler, S. (2026) · Globalizations · doi:10.1080/14747731.2026.2675839 · Cited by 7
Kim, D. (2021) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.11622137 · Cited by 6
Financial sanctions and future of globalization
Buklemishev, O. V. (2022) · Journal of the New Economic Association · doi:10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-12 · Cited by 7
Carr, A. (2022) · Australian Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1080/10361146.2022.2152309 · Cited by 6
“…for strengthening peace and commerce, policymakers are now concerned central actors ‘can weaponise networks to gather information or choke off economic and information flows, discover and exploit vulnerabilities, compel policy change, and deter unwanted actions’ (Farrell and Newman 2019, 45).”
BackgroundMoving Forward: Understanding the Geoeconomic Decade of the 2020s
Babić, M., Dixon, A. D., & Liu, I. T. (2022) · International political economy series · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01968-5_8 · Cited by 7
Cooperative Communities in the International System: Networked Cooperation of Similar States
Edgerton, J. F. (2024) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/729945 · Cited by 6
Bracarense, N., & Berthonnet, I. (2024) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2024.2307796 · Cited by 9
“For example, the frequent impositions of sanctions increasingly “weaponize interdependence,” leveraging, for example, financial exchanges for strategic advantage (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
BackgroundLost in digital translation? The humanitarian principles in the digital age
Devidal, P. (2024) · International Review of the Red Cross · doi:10.1017/s1816383124000080 · Cited by 6
Trading with Pariahs: International Trade and North Korean Sanctions
Preble, K., & Willis, C. N. (2021) · Global Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isagsq/ksae031 · Cited by 10
Introduction: Context and Drivers of Permacrisis
Mishra, O., & Sen, S. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-97-2231-0_1 · Cited by 6
Investing in the Structural Transformation: 2024 European Public Investment Outlook
Cerniglia, F., & Saraceno, F. (2024) · Open reports series · doi:10.11647/obp.0434 · Cited by 15
Banks and the noisy geopolitics of big tech regulation in Europe
James, S., & Quaglia, L. (2025) · Competition & Change · doi:10.1177/10245294251327729 · Cited by 7
When Great Powers Struggle: How Geopolitical Alignments of Small States Are Influenced by Their MNEs
Matala, S., & Stutz, C. (2025) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.13254 · Cited by 7
Policy Signaling and Foreign Electoral Uncertainty: Implications for Currency Markets
Slaski, A. (2021) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqab078 · Cited by 6
Geopolitics and International Trade
Barbieri, K. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25399-7_49-1 · Cited by 11
Bad influence: social networks, elite brokerage, and the construction of alliances
Sazak, S. C. (2020) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066120938839 · Cited by 7
“Geo-economic competition and the weaponization of interdependence are already attracting growing interest from the academic and policy scholars (Blackwill and Harris, 2016; Farrell and Newman, 2019; Wright, 2017).”
BackgroundFragile interdependence: the case of Russia-EU relations
Zheng, H. (2020) · Cambridge Review of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/09557571.2020.1839018 · Cited by 6
“These examples show that interdependence can be weaponised (Farrell and Newman 2019), subject to manipulation and can, thus, be in danger.”
BackgroundA’Zami, D., & Liu, X. (2020) · Cambridge Review of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/09557571.2020.1854179 · Cited by 8
“Indeed, one could instead read geoeconomics (and BRI with it) as turning economic means toward geopolitical ends, acting as the part and parcel of a weaponised interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019).”
BackgroundCOVID19, Supply Chain Resilience, and India: Prospects of the Pharmaceutical Industry
Palit, A., & Bhogal, P. (2022) · International law and the Global South · doi:10.1007/978-981-16-7185-2_9 · Cited by 9
Ha, Y.-K., & Woo, S. (2022) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su14031649 · Cited by 6
“When the Trump presidency began, harsh trade policies were implemented against an unspecified majority, which expanded into a diplomatic task; these trade restrictions have been narrowed down to automobiles and auto parts, which are the US’s largest deficit items [14,15] (Table 2).”
BackgroundNATO’s strategic concept: responding to Russia and China
Herold, E., Schmitt, O., & Sloan, S. R. (2022) · Defence Studies · doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2082949 · Cited by 7
“This should include the possibility to “weaponize interdependence,” understood as the ability to “leverage interdependent relationships to coerce others” (Farrell and Newman 2019, 45).”
BackgroundLai, K., Yang, Y., Na, Y., & Wang, H. (2022) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph192416670 · Cited by 8
“Disinformation is false and deceptive information disseminated with a clear intent to cause harm; for example, some interest groups that organize disinformation campaigns claim that climate change is not happening or that it is not caused by humans and deliberately conceal the threats posed by climate change to people…”
BackgroundCheon, A. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197672884.005.0001 · Cited by 6
A Framework for GeoeconomicsPreprint
Clayton, C., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4473883 · Cited by 6
Interdependence and specialization in the global semiconductor industry
Dorakh, A. (2024) · Journal of Infrastructure Policy and Development · doi:10.24294/jipd.v8i6.2436 · Cited by 5
“While the most researchers (Ciani and Nardo, 2022; Farrell and Newman, 2019) argue that interdependence increases the vulnerability of supply chains, this paper analytically contributes to an approach that economic interdependence via cooperation provide ways to reduce one-sided dependence for both…”
BackgroundEl poder internacional y las capacidades de inteligencia artificial
la Peña, N. D., & Granados, O. M. (2024) · Revista Científica General José María Córdova · doi:10.21830/19006586.1376 · Cited by 6
“Estas redes asimétricas de interdependencia generan dos mecanismos de poder para aquellos mejor posicionados (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Carver, J. (2024) · Contemporary Security Policy · doi:10.1080/13523260.2024.2430021 · Cited by 9
“On the other hand, powerful actors—often the providers of such assistance—are believed to benefit from the same networked vulnerabilities that these programs aim to redress (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
InfluentialZeng, Y., & Peterson, T. M. (2024) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/07388942241298496 · Cited by 5
“Second, our study connects recent work on sanctions busting with recent advancements in trade networks ’ effect on economic coercion (Farrell and Newman, 2019; Peterson, 2020; Zeng, 2020).”
Aligică, P. D., & Ciobanu, R. G. (2025) · Journal of risk and financial management · doi:10.3390/jrfm18020056 · Cited by 6
Gender-based economic violence and the exploitation of women: A deep dive
Saraç, E., & ODABAŞ, D. (2025) · World Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.5498/wjp.v15.i3.103725 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.