Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
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Abstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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Zhang, J. D. (2025) · Socio-Economic Review · doi:10.1093/ser/mwaf076 · Cited by 3
Hide and Seek: Offshore Financial Centers and Targeted Sanctions
Cilizoglu, M., & Estancona, C. L. (2025) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123425101087 · Cited by 2
“…imposer of targeted sanctions, is uniquely positioned to monitor compliance with and enforce its sanctions globally due to its financial clout (Farrell and Newman 2019), centrality in global financial markets (Oatley et al. 2013), and the status of the US dollar as the world ’ s principal…”
Mapping multipolarity: soft and hard power in the digital age
Stăiculescu, A. R., Bran, E., Seceleanu, A., & Papari, A. (2025) · Discover Global Society · doi:10.1007/s44282-025-00308-z · Cited by 2
Arslan, U. (2025) · Ufuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi · doi:10.58635/ufuksbedergi.1798697 · Cited by 4
Challenging Dollar Dominance? How Brazil Responds to RMB Internationalization
Araripe, T. L. A., Peruffo, L., & Cunha, A. M. (2025) · Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional · doi:10.1590/0034-7329202500224 · Cited by 2
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Stroikos, D. (2026) · Journal of Space Safety Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.jsse.2026.01.002 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.