Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
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Abstract
Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
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“Weaponizedinterdependencehighlights hownetworkcentralityandgatekeepinginglobalsystemscanbeconvertedintocoercivecapacity(Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
From Economic warfare in the Black Sea: a geoeconomic analysis of coercion through grain, blockades, and energy infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as Farrell & Newman, 2019
In the citing paper
“State-centric territorial competition has been substantially displaced in significance by an economic globalisation which 'creates its own set of international structures -through global networks -and thus generates new forms of state power [and conflict]' (Farrell and Newman 2019, 75).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“The burgeoning literature on 'weaponised interdependence' has shown how the interconnectedness of economic networks poses security risks and can increase dependency on foreign states for critical commodities, technologies or raw materials (Farrell and Newman 2019;Gertz and Evers 2020;Roberts, Moraes, and Ferguson 2019, 659).”
From The Second Cold War: US-China Competition for Centrality in Infrastructure, Digital, Production, and Finance Networks (2024) · cites this paper as Farrell and Newman 2019
In the citing paper
“При этом Китай отстает преимущественно в облачных вычислениях, где доминируют *Amazon*, *Microsoft* и *Google*11.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Так, в Саудовской Аравии были запущены крупные совместные проекты (промышленный кластер в «экономическом городе» Джазан, проект по развитию инфраструктуры Красного моря, связь *5G* и совместные исследования Луны)27.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road initiative: directions and prospects of development, advantages and risks for Russia (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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Spielberger, L., & Howarth, D. J. (2026) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2026.2701925 · Cited by 1
Geopolitical energy shocks and the hidden costs for the global south: A critical review
Purnama, I., Mutamima, A., Haq, M., Shuriye, A. O., Zhang, L., Ma, T., Dewi, W. N., & Aziz, M. (2026) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2026.104864 · Cited by 1
Huang, X. (2026) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2026.1794223 · Cited by 1
Bashfield, S. M. (2026) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009651110 · Cited by 2
Kacziba, P., & Urbanovics, A. (2026) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2026.1901113 · Cited by 4
Peráček, T. (2026) · World · doi:10.3390/world7080131 · Cited by 1
“Recent research shows that economic interdependence can be transformed into a source of political influence and coercion when states control critical nodes within global production, financial or technological networks [14].”
In the eye of the storm: Singapore's economic statecraft in navigating great power tech competition
Gong, X. (2026) · Australian Journal Of International Affairs · doi:10.1080/10357718.2026.2712329 · Cited by 1
Peer-to-peer accountability and knowledge production in OECD DAC peer reviews
Iannantuoni, A., Dietrich, S., & Reinsberg, B. (2026) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-026-09639-1 · Cited by 2
“However, in a fractured world marked by geopolitical rivalry, information is more likely to be ‘weapon - ized’—being used, manipulated, or withheld strategically to disadvantage geopolitical rivals (Farrell & Newman, 2019).”
Emmanouilidis, K., Golitsis, P., & Bellos, S. K. (2026) · International Review of Economics & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.iref.2026.105675 · Cited by 1
Kavalski, E., & Fisher‐Onar, N. (2026) · European Politics and Society · doi:10.1080/23745118.2026.2706763 · Cited by 1
Heldt, E. C., & Meunier, S. (2026) · Journal of European Integration · doi:10.1080/07036337.2026.2716369 · Cited by 1
“…EU connectivity agenda that predated the initiative’s launch; a growing perception that economic interdependence could be weaponized as a source of vulnerability (Farrell and Newman 2019); and an internal transformation of EU development finance that had been quietly underway since the early 2010s.”
Trade Policy as Geoeconomic Statecraft: Regulatory Positioning in Vietnam’s Rare Earth Supply Chains
Rosa, C. A., & Yunita, P. (2026) · Ilomata International Journal of Social Science · doi:10.61194/ijss.v7i4.2799 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Affiliations
- George Washington University (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-79
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2965425066
- Cited by
- 1,879
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 690 · 2025: 366 · 2024: 295 · 2023: 243 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 116 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 300.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Keywords
- weaponized interdependence, global economic networks, state coercion, asymmetric networks, internet, economic globalization, financial messaging, information gathering, economic sanctions
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.