Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The use of stock-based compensation as a solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers has increased dramatically since the early 1990s. We show that in a dynamic rational expectations model with asymmetric information, stock-based compensation not only induces managers to exert costly effort, but also induces them to conceal bad news about future growth options and to choose suboptimal investment policies to support the pretense. This leads to a severe overvaluation and a subsequent crash in the stock price. Our model produces many predictions that are consistent with the empirical evidence and are relevant to understanding the current crisis.
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Cited by
Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Benmelech, E., Kandel, E., & Veronesi, P.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-11-01
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1769-1820
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2020255743
- Cited by
- 430
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 45.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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