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Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (2007) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282807780323578 · Cited by 548
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Prendergast, C. (2007) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282807780323532 · Cited by 492
The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India
Iyer, L., Mani, A., Mishra, P., & Topalova, P. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.4.165 · Cited by 378
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Iyer, L., & Mani, A.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2012-08
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 723-739
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2109442605
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 29.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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