Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article examines the effect of interstate signals on the probability of civil war onset. Using a bargaining framework, the author argues that costly signals should have no effect on the likelihood that a civil war begins because they allow the government and opposition to peacefully adjust their bargaining positions to avoid the costs of fighting. In contrast, cheap signals can disrupt intrastate negotiations, which makes conflict more likely by increasing the likelihood that one of the competing parties will make excessive demands. This argument is tested using measures for sanctions, troop mobilization, alliances, and trade ties as indicators for costly signals, as well as events data as measures for cheap signals. Results demonstrate that cheap signals strongly affect the probability of civil war onset, while costly signals do not. Cheap signals hostile to the government increase the likelihood of civil war onset, while cheap supportive signals have a pacifying effect.
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Citations
Cites
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Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict
Hendrix, C. S. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310361838 · Cited by 795
Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa
Hendrix, C. S., & Salehyan, I. (2012) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343311426165 · Cited by 559
United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War
Hultman, L., Kathman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12036 · Cited by 487
Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression
Pierskalla, J. H. (2010) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002709352462 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Thyne, C. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 937-961
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2097019011
- Cited by
- 87
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 9.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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