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Cited by 939Misinformation and Its ImpactsTerrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political ViolencePopulism, Right-Wing Movements

American Conspiracy Theories

Uscinski, Joseph E., Parent, Joseph M.·2014·Oxford University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001
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Abstract

Abstract Conspiracies theories are some of the most striking features in the American political landscape: the Kennedy assassination, aliens at Roswell, subversion by Masons, Jews, Catholics, or communists, and modern movements like Birtherism and Trutherism. But what do we really know about conspiracy theories? Do they share general causes? Are they becoming more common? More dangerous? Who is targeted and why? Who are the conspiracy theorists? How has technology affected conspiracy theorizing? This book draws on three sources of original, systematic, data—120,000 letters to the editor of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune from 1890 and 2010, a two-wave survey around the 2012 presidential election, and a representative sample of Internet discussions—to offer the first century-long view of these issues. Many popular explanations find little support, but an explicitly political explanation fares well. To succeed, conspiracy theories need to follow a strategic logic that mirrors shifts in power. From this perspective, conspiracy theories are a form of threat perception that tracks foreign and domestic power asymmetries to focus attention, integrate groups, and recover from setbacks.

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Crossref · 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001

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  • People on the losing side of political processes appear more likely to believe conspiracy theories than people on the winning side.

    “People on the losing (vs. winning) side of political processes also appear more likely to believe conspiracy theories (Uscinski & Parent, 2014).”

    From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Uscinski & Parent, 2014

  • Members of groups who have objectively low status because of their income are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories than members of high-status groups.

    “Members of groups who have objectively low (vs. high) status because of their ethnicity (Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999) or income (Uscinski & Parent, 2014) are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories.”

    From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Uscinski & Parent, 2014

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Authors
Uscinski, J. E., & Parent, J. M.
Affiliations
University of Miami (US)
ORCID
Venue
Oxford University Press eBooks
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2014-09-08
DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001
OpenAlex
W1821499963
Cited by
939
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 116 · 2025: 154 · 2024: 135 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 139 · 2021: 97 · 2020: 53 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 2
FWCI
20.38
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
Keywords
conspiracy theories, American politics, threat perception, power imbalance, political strategy, John F. Kennedy assassination, Roswell incident, masons, anti-communism, 2012 presidential election, online discourse, history of conspiracy theories

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