The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation
Abstract
The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation by James Andreoni, William Harbaugh and Lise Vesterlund. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 893-902 of American Economic Review, June 2003
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Metadata
- Authors
- Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W., & Vesterlund, L.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-05-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 893-902
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123690179
- Cited by
- 570
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 36.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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