The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance
Abstract
This paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world: life insurance. We report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information. We conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market, as in those for most other products. (JEL D8, G1, I1, L0)
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Cites
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Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708
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McIntosh, C., & Wydick, B. (2005) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.11.008 · Cited by 399
Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets
de Meza, D., & Webb, D. C. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696408 · Cited by 358
Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications
Chiappori, P.-A., Jullien, B., Salanié, B., & Salanié, F. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x · Cited by 312
Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence
Arcidiacono, P., Aucejo, E. M., Fang, H., & Spenner, K. I. (2011) · Quantitative Economics · doi:10.3982/qe83 · Cited by 80
“Conceptually, we assume that Y is a linear function of 22The rapidly growing literature includes Cawley and Philipson (1999) for life insurance market, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) for auto insurance market, Cardon and Hendel (2001) for health insurance market, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) for…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Cawley, J., & Philipson, T.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-09-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 827-846
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124643791
- Cited by
- 355
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 17.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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