The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
Abstract
The Grossman-Helpman “Protection for Sale” model, concerning the political economy of trade protection, yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of import barriers. Our objective is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its key structural parameters. We find that the pattern of protection in the United States in 1983 is broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. A surprising finding is that the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is many times larger than the weight of contributions. (JEL F1)
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Cites
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Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection
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“This is similar in spirit to Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who estimate the utility weights of public welfare and lobby contributions in determining the level of trade protection granted to different sectors.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goldberg, P. K., & Maggi, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-12-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1135-1155
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W3122977567
- Cited by
- 854
- References
- 22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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