The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Abstract
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the “social norm”), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy, trust in a favorable norm may be signaled. (JEL D64, D82, J41, Z13)
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Citations
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“In addition to providing “bad news” (15) about the vaccine, enforcement may also both undermine trust in the state and signal that the state does not trust the individual to respect the social norm of protecting others (25).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Sliwka, D.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-05-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 999-1012
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123618071
- Cited by
- 421
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 46.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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