The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Misselling through Agents
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's “suitability” for the specific needs of customers. When structuring salesforce compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from “misselling” unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. (JEL M31, M37, M52)
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Cited by
BOLTON, P., FREIXAS, X., & SHAPIRO, J. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01708.x · Cited by 940
How Does Household Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice?
GAUDECKER, H. V. (2015) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12231 · Cited by 596
GENNAIOLI, N., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. (2015) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12188 · Cited by 537
The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults
Rajan, U., Seru, A., & Vig, V. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.012 · Cited by 497
Financial literacy, financial advice, and financial behavior
Stolper, O. A., & Walter, A. (2017) · Journal of Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11573-017-0853-9 · Cited by 471
“21 In a related study, Japelli (2010) conducts a cross-country assessment of economic literacy in 55 countries based on the IMD World Competitive Yearbook (WCY).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Inderst, R., & Ottaviani, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-05-01
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 883-908
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2145090632
- Cited by
- 385
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 94.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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