The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Abstract
Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
Expectations and the neutrality of money
Lucas, R. E. (1972) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90142-1 · Cited by 4,740
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2590 · Cited by 1,903
Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
Aumann, R. J. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 · Cited by 1,630
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
Aumann, R. J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911154 · Cited by 1,613
Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
Blackwell, D. (1953) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177729032 · Cited by 1,406
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Maskin, E. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00076 · Cited by 1,180
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4 · Cited by 912
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
Mertens, J. F., & Zamir, S. (1985) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01770224 · Cited by 757
Multistage Games with Communication
Myerson, R. B. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913154 · Cited by 588
Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition
Caplin, A., & Dean, M. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20140117 · Cited by 498
Optimal Information Disclosure
Rayo, L., & Segal, I. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657922 · Cited by 484
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
Myerson, R. B. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912116 · Cited by 434
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10008 · Cited by 389
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2016) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te1808 · Cited by 379
Self-citationThe Limits of Price Discrimination
Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., & Morris, S. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130848 · Cited by 362
Self-citationFulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release
Novshek, W., & Sonnenschein, H. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003442 · Cited by 307
Ely, J., Frankel, A., & Kamenica, E. (2015) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/677350 · Cited by 291
Information structures in optimal auctions
Bergemann, D., & Pesendorfer, M. (2007) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001 · Cited by 283
Self-citationAlonso, R., & Câmara, O. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20140737 · Cited by 244
Gentzkow, M., & Kamenica, E. (2017) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdw052 · Cited by 226
Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11105 · Cited by 206
Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
Kolotilin, A. (2018) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te1805 · Cited by 199
The Design and Price of Information
Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A., & Smolin, A. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161079 · Cited by 197
Self-citationFoundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
Chung, K., & Ely, J. C. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00427.x · Cited by 194
Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. E. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.p20161046 · Cited by 154
Self-citationInformation Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.2139/ssrn.982249 · Cited by 145
Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
Forges, F. (1993) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf01075202 · Cited by 137
First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, D., Brooks, B. C., & Morris, S. E. (2017) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta13958 · Cited by 128
Self-citationBrocas, I., & Carrillo, J. D. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00119.x · Cited by 123
A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception
Caplin, A., & Martin, D. (2014) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12130 · Cited by 111
Weintraub, S. (1964) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/000271626435200116 · Cited by 103
Comparison of Information Structures
Gossner, O. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0706 · Cited by 96
Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
Ui, T. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00246 · Cited by 89
Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
Lehrer, E., Rosenberg, D., & Shmaya, E. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007 · Cited by 85
Algorithmic information structure design: a survey
Dughmi, S. (2017) · ACM SIGecom Exchanges · doi:10.1145/3055589.3055591 · Cited by 77
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited
Forges, F. (2006) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3 · Cited by 69
Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps
Perez-Richet, E. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.5.469 · Cited by 63
Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
Forges, F., & Koessler, F. (2004) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.006 · Cited by 61
Bayesian Persuasion in Coordination Games
Goldstein, I., & Huang, C. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.p20161047 · Cited by 60
Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
Liu, Q. (2014) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010 · Cited by 35
Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational RobustnessPreprint
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. E. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2887380 · Cited by 19
Self-citation
Cited by
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits
Slivkins, A. (2019) · Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning · doi:10.1561/2200000068 · Cited by 780
Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design
Kamenica, E. (2019) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025739 · Cited by 404
Inherent Tradeoffs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores
(2023) · The Societal Impacts of Algorithmic Decision-Making · doi:10.1145/3603195.3603197 · Cited by 310
Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology
Agarwal, N., Moehring, A., Rajpurkar, P., & Salz, T. (2023) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4505053 · Cited by 161
Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology
Agarwal, N., Moehring, A., Rajpurkar, P., & Salz, T. (2023) · doi:10.3386/w31422 · Cited by 161
Metadata
- Authors
- Bergemann, D., & Morris, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2019-03-01
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 44-95
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121860146
- Cited by
- 527
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 34.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.