Financial Contracting
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved, from treating firms' profitability as given, to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability, to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.
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Citations
Cites
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Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
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A Survey of Corporate Governance
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Determinants of corporate borrowing
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The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
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Self-citationAgency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
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The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
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Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984) · doi:10.3386/w1396 · Cited by 6,745
What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data
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Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
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MethodAgency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
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Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk
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Zingales, L. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00262 · Cited by 1,495
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
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Self-citationKaplan, S., & Stromberg, P. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7660 · Cited by 1,180
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial IncentivesPreprint
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Self-citationDefault and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
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Self-citationDebt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
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Self-citationA Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
Dewatripont, M., & Tirole, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118355 · Cited by 835
The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry
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A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
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Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors
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On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial PolicyPreprint
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Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information
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Renegotiation and the Impossibility of Optimal Investment
Persons, J. C. (1994) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/7.2.419 · Cited by 61
Cited by
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · Cited by 3,669
Kaplan, S. N., & Stromberg, P. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00245 · Cited by 1,533
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
“Rather than attempt to summarize these theoretical developments, we direct interested readers to surveys by Roberts and Sufi (2009a), Hart (2001), Allen and Winton (1995), and Harris and Raviv (1991).”
BackgroundEntrepreneurship and Economic Growth
Audretsch, D. B., Keilbach, M. C., & Lehmann, E. E. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183511.001.0001 · Cited by 1,370
Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
KAPLAN, S. N., & STRÖMBERG, P. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00696.x · Cited by 1,091
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-12-01
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1079-1100
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2132332045
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 67.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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