The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Open accessAbstract
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--help provide credible commitment or these purposes. In addition, the authors suggest that some federalism are self-sustaining.
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Citations
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Cited by
Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
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Metadata
- Authors
- Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1997-11-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 83-92
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2053174125
- Cited by
- 1,495
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 71.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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