Smaller Slices of a Growing Pie: The Effects of Entry in Platform Markets
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Entry of new firms onto a platform has an ambivalent effect on the incumbent firms operating on the platform: the main tension lies between the negative effects of increased competitive pressure and positive indirect network effects. This paper empirically studies the net effect of these countervailing forces and its dependence on firm quality, using a quasi-exogenous shock on a large online platform. On average, market expansion favors incumbents, though the average effect masks substantial heterogeneity: high-quality incumbents experience significant increases in sales and revenue, whereas low-quality firms perform unambiguously worse. Lastly, the paper explores the main mechanisms and firms’ responses. (JEL D22, D85, L14, L15, L84)
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“Previous work suggests that high-quality suppliers may be generally less threatened by adverse market shocks (e.g., Syverson, 2004;Reshef, 2023).”
From The Short-Term Effects of Generative Artificial Intelligence on Employment: Evidence from an Online Labor Market (2023) · cites this paper as Reshef, 2023
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Cited by
Hui, X., Reshef, O., & Zhou, L. (2024) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2023.18441 · Cited by 200
Self-citationHui, X., Reshef, O., & Zhou, L. (2023) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4527336 · Cited by 116
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Reshef, O.
- Affiliations
- Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis (email: )
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2023-11-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 183-207
- ISSN
- 1945-7669
- 1945-7685
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 14
- Language
- en
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