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Cited by 218Digital Platforms and EconomicsDigital Games and MediaMerger and Competition Analysis

Software exclusivity and the scope of indirect network effects in the U.S. home video game market

Open access
Corts, Kenneth S., Lederman, Mara·2009·International Journal of Industrial Organization
DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.08.002
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Crossref · 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.08.002

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims other papers make about this one

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  • Research on complementor multihoming has largely been conducted in mature platform contexts where platform dynamics have been reduced to interactions between two dominant platforms, leading to a one-off multihoming decision with only one multihoming option.

    “research on complementor multihoming has largely been conducted in mature platform contexts where platform dynamics have been reduced to the interactions between two dominant platforms; consequently, complementors face a one-off multihoming decision with only one multihoming option”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Corts and Lederman 2009

    Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 2 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

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  • Multihoming can enable complementors to access additional user bases, quickly drive up their revenues, and shorten the time to profitability.

    “First, multihoming can enable complementors to access additional user bases, quickly drive up their revenues, and shorten the time to profitability (Bresnahan et al. 2014;Corts and Lederman 2009;Rietveld and Eggers 2018).”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Corts and Lederman 2009

    Section II (Industry Background; page not available) says multi-platform releases let publishers sell to users of another console, earn additional revenue, and make some games profitable that would not be profitable as exclusive releases. Section VI (Conclusion; page not available) says they can spread development costs across platforms. Neither section establishes that revenues rise quickly or that the time to profitability is shortened. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Fast multihoming to another platform can help complementors expand their market and spread the fixed costs of production and marketing.

    “While achieving scale is often challenging in nascent markets, fast multihoming to another platform can help complementors expand their market (Kretschmer and Claussen 2016) and spread the fixed costs of production and marketing (Corts and Lederman 2009).”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Corts and Lederman 2009

    The Conclusion says multi-platform releases let publishers spread fixed game-development costs across users of competing platforms; Industry Background likewise explains how a second platform can help recoup those costs. The cited paper does not establish that publishers spread fixed marketing costs, which the citing sentence also attributes to it. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Most studies in the platform literature have centered around complementors' market entry strategies and have mainly examined single-platform settings.

    “Most studies in this field have centered around complementors' market entry strategies (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012;Cennamo et al. 2018;Corts and Lederman 2009;Huang et al. 2013;Kapoor and Agarwal 2017), and they have mainly examined single-platform settings (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012;Kapoor and Agarwal 2017).”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Corts and Lederman 2009

    The Industry Background discusses publishers’ choices to release games on one or multiple platforms, which relates to complementors’ platform-entry strategies. But it explicitly says explaining changes in exclusivity is not the research focus; the focus is how exclusivity affects indirect network effects. The single-platform-settings clause cites other works, not Corts and Lederman. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Complementors can decide to approach new market opportunities, particularly when encountering strong competition within a market.

    “Beyond those strategic considerations within one platform ecosystem, complementors can also decide to approach new market opportunities, particularly when encountering strong competition within a market (Corts & Lederman, 2009;Nerbel & Kreutzer, 2023).”

    From What role do data network effects play for multihoming complements? An empirical analysis of platform complementors’ strategies for consumer value creation (2025) · cites this paper as Corts & Lederman, 2009

    Section II (Industry Background; page unavailable) says game publishers may release titles on multiple platforms to reach a larger audience. Section III.B (Software supply; page unavailable) discusses how growth in rival platforms can draw software development away from a focal platform. These passages support pursuing users on other platforms, but do not establish that complementors seek new markets particularly because they face strong competition within a market. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Shapiro, C. and H. Varian, 1999, Information Rules, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

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Related

Authors
Corts, K. S., & Lederman, M.
Affiliations
University of Toronto (CA)
Corresponding author
Lederman, Mara
ORCID
Corts, Kenneth S.
Venue
International Journal of Industrial Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2009-03
Volume
27
Issue
2
Pages
121-136
ISSN
0167-7187 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.08.002
OpenAlex
W3121818261
Cited by
218
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 4
FWCI
28.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • International Journal of Industrial Organization (publishedVersion)
  • TSpace (University of Toronto) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Games and Media
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
Keywords
indirect network effects, installed base, platform competition, video game console market

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