The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany
Open accessAbstract
We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. (JEL C93, D64, H26, H71, K34, Z12)
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No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
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WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2016-08-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 203-232
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W2341092366
- Cited by
- 300
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 70.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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