Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study the growth of online peer-to-peer markets. Using data from TaskRabbit, an expanding marketplace for domestic tasks at the time of our study, we show that growth varies considerably across cities. To disentangle the potential drivers of growth, we look separately at demand and supply imbalances, network effects, and geographic heterogeneity. First, we find that supply is highly elastic: in periods when demand doubles, sellers perform almost twice as many tasks, prices hardly increase, and the probability of requested tasks being matched falls only slightly. The first result implies that in markets where supply can accommodate demand fluctuations, growth relies on attracting buyers at a faster rate than sellers. Second and perhaps most surprisingly, we find no evidence of network effects in matching: doubling the number of buyers and sellers only doubles the number of matches. Third, we show that the cities where market fundamentals promote efficient matching of buyers and sellers are also those that are the fastest growing. This heterogeneity in matching efficiency is related to two measures of market thickness: geographic density (buyers and sellers living close together) and level of task standardization (buyers requesting homogeneous tasks). Our results have two main implications for peer-to-peer markets in which network effects are limited by the local and time-sensitive nature of the services exchanged. First, marketplace growth largely depends on strategic geographic expansion. Second, a competitive rather than winner-take-all equilibrium may arise in the long run. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cullen, Z., & Farronato, C.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2021-07
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3985-4003
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2193156406
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 17.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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