Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 59 of the 89 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
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## TL;DR
This paper presents IIT 4.0, a mathematical framework that defines consciousness as a substrate’s intrinsic cause–effect power, characterized by a maximal substrate (a complex) and its unfolded Φ-structure. Using simple example networks, the authors illustrate how connectivity, state, and architecture determine whether a system can support consciousness and what kind of experience it specifies.
## Key findings
- IIT 4.0 formalizes five phenomenal axioms as physical postulates: existence, intrinsicality, information, integration, exclusion, and composition; a conscious substrate must take and make a difference within itself, be specific, irreducible, definite, and structured.
- In example networks, bottlenecks and degeneracy keep complexes small and Φ low, while weakly connected modules split into separate complexes; for the 6-unit copy cycle, the paper reports a maximal φs = 1.74 ibits but low Φ = 7.65 because the Φ-structure contains only first-order distinctions.
- A specialized 6-unit lattice produced 27 distinctions out of 63 possible distinctions, yielding a much richer Φ-structure than the copy cycle.
- In the activity example, changing one unit’s state altered the Φ-structure substantially; when a unit was inactivated rather than merely inactive, its compound Φ-fold collapsed and the complex shrank.
- In the functional equivalence example, three systems with the same input–output function and equivalent global dynamics nonetheless had different Φ-structures: one had Φ = 21.01 ibits, another had Φ = 3.64 ibits, and the third was reducible with φs = 0 ibits.
## Methods
- The paper develops a mathematical formalism for IIT 4.0 based on a substrate’s transition probability matrix (TPM), then applies it to idealized binary networks in the Results and discussion.
- It identifies maximal cause–effect states using intrinsic information, then computes system integrated information (φs) via minimum partitions (MIPs), selects maximal substrates (complexes) by maximal φs, and unfolds cause–effect structures into distinctions and relations to obtain Φ.
- The worked examples use simple simulated systems of 5–6 binary units, analyzed with the “iit-4.0” feature branch of PyPhi.
## Limitations
- The authors state that a full analysis of complexes and their cause–effect structure is not feasible for realistic systems because exhaustive observations, manipulations, and calculations face multiple nested combinatorial explosions.
- They note that the framework is illustrated on extremely simple, simulated networks rather than actual substrates, so the examples are explanatory demonstrations rather than empirical analyses.
- They explicitly say IIT 4.0 is “work in progress,” and that some algorithmic choices remain open to further evaluation, including treatment of background conditions and tie resolution under TPM symmetries.
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In the paper
“Moreover, if the background conditions are well controlled, neurons are thought to interact in a highly reliable, nearly deterministic manner [41–43].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Results and discussion > Consciousness and connectivity
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [41] Mainen ZF, Sejnowski TJ. Reliability of spike timing in neocortical neurons. Science. 1995; 268(5216): 1503– 1506. doi: 10.1126/science.7770778 7770778 source
- Partly supportedcites [42] Hires SA, Gutnisky DA, Yu J, O’Connor DH, Svoboda K. Low-noise encoding of active touch by layer 4 in the somatosensory cortex. eLife. 2015; 4: e06619. doi: 10.7554/eLife.06619 26245232 PMC4525079 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says that accounting for hidden states and uncontrolled factors may reveal cortical spike trains to be deterministic and predictable. That supports the qualified idea that controlled conditions can reveal reliable spiking, but the paper does not establish that neurons generally interact in a nearly deterministic manner; its measurements concern layer 4 neurons during active touch. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Disputedcites [43] Nolte M, Reimann MW, King JG, Markram H, Muller EB. Cortical reliability amid noise and chaos. Nature Communications. 2019; 10(1): 1– 15. doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-11633-8 31439838 PMC6706377 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) describes the nearly deterministic view but then challenges it: even in tightly controlled in-vitro conditions, synaptic release is unreliable, so neurons respond less reliably to presynaptic inputs than to current injections. The paper reports highly reliable network responses under particular input conditions, not reliable interactions merely because background conditions are controlled. (LLM, conf=0.86)
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hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“This is a measure of the difference between two probability distributions which uniquely satisfies three properties (causality, intrinsicality, and specificity) that align with the postulates of IIT (but also have independent justification):”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] Barbosa LS, Marshall W, Streipert S, Albantakis L, Tononi G. A measure for intrinsic information. Scientific Reports. 2020; 10(1): 18803. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-75943-4 33139829 PMC7606539 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and discussion and Conclusion state that intrinsic difference (ID) captures a difference between probability distributions and is uniquely characterized by causality, specificity, and intrinsicality. The Introduction explains those properties, but the passages in our copy do not establish the additional claim that they align with IIT's postulates. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“However, to account for the structure of experience, considering only the cause–effect power of the individual units or of the system as a whole would be insufficient [17, 29].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Overview of IIT’s framework > Implementing the postulates
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [17] Grasso M, Albantakis L, Lang JP, Tononi G. Causal reductionism and causal structures. Nature Neuroscience. 2021; 24(10): 1348– 1355. doi: 10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8 34556868 source
- Supportedcites [29] Albantakis L, Tononi G. Causal Composition: Structural Differences among Dynamically Equivalent Systems. Entropy 2019, Vol 21, Page 989. 2019; 21(10): 989. source
Section 4.3 explains that a holistic account of visual experience misses its distinct spots and their relations, while a reductionist account of individual spots misses how they compose an extended scene. It also says that a system’s compositional cause–effect structure is needed to characterize the structure of phenomenal experience. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Because consciousness is the way it is, the formulation of its properties in physical, operational terms should be unique and based on quantities that uniquely satisfy the postulates [12, 32].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [12] Barbosa LS, Marshall W, Albantakis L, Tononi G. Mechanism Integrated Information. Entropy. 2021; 23(3): 362. doi: 10.3390/e23030362 33803765 PMC8003304 source
The Introduction says IIT translates properties of consciousness into physical postulates with a mathematical formulation. The Discussion says that, because the quantity and quality of consciousness cannot vary with an arbitrary choice of measure, a unique measure of intrinsic information based on the postulates is a critical requirement. This supports the cited principle, specifically as applied to that measure. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Supportedcites [32] Barrett AB, Mediano PAM. The phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2019; 26(1-2): 11– 20. source
The Abstract (p. 1) says that, for IIT’s account of consciousness to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Φ consistent with its axioms. The Introduction (p. 1) describes Φ as a proposed fundamental physical quantity. Together, these support the citing sentence’s claim about a unique physical formulation, though the paper argues that the current Φ does not yet meet that standard. (LLM, conf=0.89)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Selectivity means that if p < 1, the system’s causal power becomes subadditive (dilution) (see [14] for details).”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] Barbosa LS, Marshall W, Streipert S, Albantakis L, Tononi G. A measure for intrinsic information. Scientific Reports. 2020; 10(1): 18803. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-75943-4 33139829 PMC7606539 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Theory section says that adding a fully noisy independent channel dilutes intrinsic information and makes the measure sub-additive. Results and discussion specifies sub-additivity for some independent noisy distributions, not a general rule whenever p < 1; it attributes this behavior to intrinsicality rather than selectivity. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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In the citing paper
“It is important to emphasize that the absolute or isolated value of any IIT estimate lacks intrinsic meaning.”
From Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis (2025) · cites this paper as Albantakis et al., 2023
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In the citing paper
“Additionally, IIT, as it is presented by its original authors ( Albantakis et al., 2023 ), seems incompatible with any dimensionality of consciousness other than an overall Φ value”
From What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review (2024) · cites this paper as Albantakis et al., 2023
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Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT also makes several experimental predictions that have been validated in humans”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT is supported by growing scientific evidence about our own consciousness.For example, IIT provides a selfconsistent account of why the cerebral cortex is important for consciousness but the cerebellum is not, despite having four times more neurons; why consciousness fades in deep slowwave sleep, even though cortical neurons remain active; and why consciousness might have evolved”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT holds that a maximal F value will be reached primarily in posterior cortex (''hot zone'') 78,95 when dense reentrant interactions occur between higher and lower visual areas.7”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [95]
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Citations
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InfluentialSelf-citationBreakdown of cortical effective connectivity during sleep
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“The postulates of IIT have been and are being applied to account for the location of the substrate of consciousness in the brain [7] and for its loss and recovery in physiological and pathological conditions [25,26].”
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“This is done by causally marginalizing all variables in X = S \M , which corresponds to imposing a uniform distribution as p(Xt) [11,13,15] (note [44]).”
InfluentialSelf-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Findlay G, Marshall W, Albantakis L, Mayner WGP, Koch C, Tononi G. Dissociating Intelligence from Consciousness in Artificial Systems – Implications of Integrated Information Theory. In: Proceedings of the 2019 Towards Conscious AI Systems Symposium, AAAI SSS19; 2019 and forthcoming.
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“Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT) 4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) 6–10 via a theory-neutral consortium 11–13 .”
Self-citationAn integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness
Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114
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“IIT identifies five properties that hold true for every conceivable experience (Albantakis et al., 2023).”
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Self-citationA synergistic workspace for human consciousness revealed by Integrated Information Decomposition
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A Synergistic Workspace for Human Consciousness Revealed by Integrated Information DecompositionPreprint
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What makes a theory of consciousness unscientific?
IIT-Concerned, Arnold, D. H., Baxter, M. G., Bekinschtein, T. A., Bengio, Y., Bisley, J. W., Browning, J., Buonomano, D. V., Carmel, D., Carrasco, M., et al. (2025) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-025-01881-x · Cited by 56
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Thomas, C. K., Saad, W., & Xiao, Y. L. (2023) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Information Theory · doi:10.1109/jsait.2023.3336538 · Cited by 63
“The proposed AI-based components in the SC chain rely on novel semantic information measures inspired by the concept of integrated information theory (IIT) in the literature on the theory of consciousness [22].”
BackgroundIdentifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
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Khan, S., Huang, Y., Timuçin, D., Bailey, S., Lee, S., Lopes, J., Gaunce, E., Mosberger, J., Zhan, M., Abdelrahman, B., et al. (2024) · eneuro · doi:10.1523/eneuro.0291-24.2024 · Cited by 30
“…is understood in terms of functional connectivity (Dehaene et al., 1998; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Mashour et al., 2020) or classical integrated information (Tononi, 2008; Tononi et al., 2016; Albantakis et al., 2023) among neurons, cortical areas, or parts of the system.”
BackgroundIs artificial consciousness achievable? Lessons from the human brain
Farisco, M., Evers, K., & Changeux, J. (2024) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106714 · Cited by 61
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“In fact, theoretically IIT defines the content of consciousness as the shape of its conceptual (i.e. cause–effect) structure, but no way for quantifying it is described so far, notwithstanding relevant attempts currently in progress (Haun and Tononi 2019; Albantakis, et al. 2023).”
BackgroundConsciousness science: where are we, where are we going, and what if we get there?
Cleeremans, A., Mudrik, L., & Seth, A. K. (2025) · Frontiers in Science · doi:10.3389/fsci.2025.1546279 · Cited by 51
“A very different perspective is provided by “ integrated information theory ” (IIT), developed by Giulio Tononi and colleagues since the 1990s (44, 106, 107).”
InfluentialTowards a structural turn in consciousness science
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Unravelling consciousness and brain function through the lens of time, space, and information
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“Besides being pursued in some studies in humans (Boly et al., 2015; Mensen et al., 2018, 2017) and mice (Gandhi et al., 2023; Mayner et al., 2022), a new 4.0 Φ -based (Albantakis et al., 2023) matching measure is currently being developed (Tononi, personal communication).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNegro, N. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae012 · Cited by 21
“…through integrated information is at the core of IIT, but the specific claim that consciousness is identical to the specific formalism presented by Albantakis et al. (2023) is outside of the core: the specific formalism to determine Φ has changed throughout the various iterations of the theory…”
BackgroundA construct-first approach to consciousness science
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“The resulting framework is bottom-up, exploratory, allows for new theoretical syntheses, offers motivation for new research directions, and holds the promise of a data-driven turn within consciousness science.”
BackgroundContributions of Basal Ganglia Circuits to Perception, Attention, and Consciousness
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“Likewise, it is time for current views of perception and consciousness focusing on cortical and thalamo-cortical networks (Albantakis et al., 2023; Mashour, Roelfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020) to be revised to incorporate their complex relationships with the BG.”
BackgroundEvers, K., Farisco, M., & Pennartz, C. M. A. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668 · Cited by 22
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Cardone, P., Alnagger, N., Annen, J., Bicego, A., Gosseries, O., & Martial, C. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae025 · Cited by 20
“Finally, (intrinsic) information (Bar-bosa et al. 2020), used in the latest version of IIT (Albantakis et al. 2023), is not yet measured by LZC or PCI.”
MethodInfluentialA burst-dependent thalamocortical substrate for perceptual awareness
Whyte, C. J., Müller, E. J., Aru, J., Larkum, M. E., John, Y. J., Munn, B., & Shine, J. M. (2025) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012951 · Cited by 23
“In addition, in previous work we have shown that diffuse matrix-type control of bursting in a sheet of L5 PT cells maximises an approximate measure of integrated information [40], in line with integrated information theory [84].”
Meditation and complexity: a review and synthesis of evidence
Atad, D. A., Mediano, P. A. M., Rosas, F. E., & Berkovich‐Ohana, A. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf013 · Cited by 41
On the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference
Whyte, C. J., Corcoran, A. W., Robinson, J., Smith, R., Moran, R. J., Parr, T., Friston, K. J., Seth, A. K., & Hohwy, J. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.11.002 · Cited by 15
“For example, the hard core of integrated information theory (Albantakis et al., 2023; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016) is constituted by the postulates that lead to the derivation of Phi as a measure of consciousness.”
On biological and artificial consciousness: A case for biological computationalism
Milinkovic, B., & Aru, J. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106524 · Cited by 35
An adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousnessPreprint
Melloni, L., Ferrante, O., Górska, U., Henin, S. E., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A. F., Lepauvre, A., Liu, L., Richter, D., Vidal, Y., et al. (2023) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3101836/v1 · Cited by 22
Self-citationThe fundamental tension in integrated information theory 4.0’s realist idealism
Cea, I., Negro, N., & Signorelli, C. M. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25101453 · Cited by 13
“Although previous versions of IIT did not explicitly clarify the logic of this translation (for discussions on this point, see [16–19]), IIT 4.0 explains that the postulates are inferred via an “inference to a good explanation” from the axioms and a triad of basic assumptions [11,12].”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialLiang, Z., Lan, Z., Wang, Y., Bai, Y., He, J., Wang, J., & Li, X. (2023) · Journal of Neural Engineering · doi:10.1088/1741-2552/ad12dc · Cited by 14
“Currently, many consciousness-related studies focus on integrated information theory [29–32], which proposes that the LOC is associated with disruptions in information integration across long-range brain regions [33].”
Nilsen, A. S., Arena, A., & Storm, J. F. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae021 · Cited by 20
“…the complexity of the intrinsic causal structure of the system (brain), as stressed by the IIT of consciousness (Tononi 2012, Oizumi et al. 2014, Albantakis et al. 2022), our results suggest that technically simpler measures based on spontaneous activity can be valid alternatives in some…”
BackgroundMethodAs One and Many: Relating Individual and Emergent Group-Level Generative Models in Active Inference
Waade, P. T., Olesen, C., Laursen, J. E., Nehrer, S. W., Heins, C., Friston, K. J., & Mathys, C. D. (2025) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e27020143 · Cited by 16
“There might also be ways to integrate multiple states as active or sensory states at the group level (perhaps in the fashion of integrated information, as in [71] or [72]).”
Torres–Martínez, S. (2025) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-024-02165-x · Cited by 20
“According to Information Integration Theory ( IIT 1.0 , Tononi 2004; ITT 3.0 , Oizumi et al. 2014; ITT 4.0 , Albantakis et al. 2023), the question of consciousness needs to be defined from a first-person perspective.”
InfluentialWhat Is It like to Be a Brain Organoid? Phenomenal Consciousness in a Biological Neural Network
Montoya, I., & Montoya, D. A. C. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25091328 · Cited by 11
“…constitutes an “experience” Dynamics in electrophysiological activity display coherent connectivity General Parts of IIT 4.0 Still Predict the Results on BNNs In the most recent iteration of the theory [26] the focus moved to make it mathematically sound, turning it into a more abstract postulate.”
BackgroundInfluentialPreliminaries to artificial consciousness: A multidimensional heuristic approach
Evers, K., Farisco, M., Chatila, R., Earp, B. D., Freire, I. T., Hamker, F. H., Németh, E., Verschure, P. F. M. J., & Khamassi, M. (2025) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.01.002 · Cited by 28
Separating weak integrated information theory into inspired and aspirational approaches
Leung, A., & Tsuchiya, N. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad012 · Cited by 9
The Consciousness of Neuroscience
Gómez-Marín, À. (2023) · eNeuro · doi:10.1523/eneuro.0434-23.2023 · Cited by 14
“The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness (Albantakis et al., 2023), the brainchild of the Italian neuro-scientist Giulio Tononi, is one of the two leading theories of consciousness recently put to a test against another main theory, under an adversarial collaboration funded by the…”
BackgroundToward a universal theory of consciousness
Kanai, R., & Fujisawa, I. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae022 · Cited by 31
The unfathomable richness of seeing
Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2025) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.06.001 · Cited by 19
Self-citationRowe, E., Garrido, M. I., & Tsuchiya, N. (2023) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2023.11.016 · Cited by 10
“It is worth noting that one of the posterior theories, IIT (Tononi, 2004; Balduzzi & Tononi, 2008; Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis et al., 2023), needs to be tested in a highly computationally demanding way and eventually verified by the computation of integrated information and its identification of…”
BackgroundEight challenges in developing theory of intelligence
Huang, H. (2024) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2024.1388166 · Cited by 12
“In this second theory, unconscious states have a low information content, while conscious states have a high information content.”
BackgroundNeural correlates of consciousness in an auditory no-report fMRI study
Dellert, T., Balster, H., Schloßmacher, I., Bruchmann, M., Moeck, R., & Straube, T. (2025) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2025.10.026 · Cited by 15
Simultaneity of consciousness with physical reality: the key that unlocks the mind-matter problem
Sanfey, J. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1173653 · Cited by 13
“The theory has evolved over the years, (Tononi, 2004, 2008; Oizumi et al., 2014: Tononi and Koch, 2015; Albantakis et al., 2022; Tononi et al., 2022 3 ).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWhen philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions
Usher, M., Negro, N., Jacobson, H., & Tsuchiya, N. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1306023 · Cited by 11
Consciousness and the Dying Brain
Mashour, G. A., Lee, U., Pal, D., & Li, D. (2024) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0000000000004970 · Cited by 14
“7 Two are of particular relevance for the consideration of near-death experiences: integrated information theory 15 and the global neuronal workspace hypothesis.”
BackgroundThe Default Mode Network and inner time consciousness
Northoff, G., Buccellato, A., & Ventura, B. (2025) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2025.101524 · Cited by 12
“The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness highlights the posterior cortical regions as key for consciousness [2], while the Global Neuronal Workspace theory focuses on the prefrontal cortex, namely, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [32].”
Consilience in Causation: Causal Emergence Is Found Across Measures of Causation
Comolatti, R., & Hoel, E. P. (2025) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e27080825 · Cited by 32
“…specific criticisms of info-theoretic accounts of causation (e.g., recent work on grounding integrated information in axiomatic considerations [29,30]), it is a reasonable question whether causal emergence is a general phenomenon or some peculiar quirk of merely a few measures of causation and…”
Artificial intelligence, consciousness and psychiatry
Tononi, G., & Raison, C. L. (2024) · World Psychiatry · doi:10.1002/wps.21222 · Cited by 11
Self-citationNeural correlates of pure presence
Boly, M., Smith, R., Borrego, G. V., Pozuelos, J. P., Alauddin, T., Malinowski, P., & Tononi, G. (2024) · doi:10.1101/2024.04.18.590081 · Cited by 7
“In contrast, integrated information theory (IIT, presented in detail in (8) and in an online wiki (9)) argues that an experience corresponds to a “cause–effect structure”, rather than to a computation, a function, or a process.”
BackgroundSelf-citationEvent-related potential correlates of consciousness in simple auditory hallucinations
Filimonov, D., Lenkkeri, S., Koivisto, M., & Revonsuo, A. (2025) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2025.121168 · Cited by 13
Stucky, B. (2025) · Nature and Science of Sleep · doi:10.2147/nss.s506461 · Cited by 7
Extrapolating Other Consciousnesses: The Prospects and Limits of Analogical Abduction
Negro, N., & Mudrik, L. (2025) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2025.10104 · Cited by 8
“For example, the integrated information theory (Albantakis et al. 2023; Tononi et al. 2016) aspires to provide such context-independent explanatory structure, given that it seeks to explain consciousness by relying on the notion of cause – effect powers of the physical world (but see Lau and Michel…”
Why does time feel the way it does? Toward a principled account of temporal experience
Comolatti, R., Grasso, M., & Tononi, G. (2025) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2025.113434 · Cited by 26
“…of non-directed inclusion, connection, and fusion as they hold among four distinctions corresponding to spots (S 1 through S 4 ), and the rightmost panel shows how they hold among contiguous distinctions throughout the cause-effect structure (for simplicity, only the mechanisms labels are shown).”
InfluentialSelf-citationIntrinsic units: identifying a system’s causal grain
Marshall, W., Findlay, G., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag013 · Cited by 13
“Based on the postulates of intrinsicality, information, and integration, ϕ s ( s ) quantifies how the system specifies a cause-effect state as a whole, above and beyond how it specifies the same cause-effect state as independentparts(Albantakis et al. 2023b).”
InfluentialSelf-citationOlesen, C., Waade, P. T., Albantakis, L., & Mathys, C. D. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011346 · Cited by 17
“In IIT, existence is an irreducible causal structure [10], while in the FEP it is the presence of a stable Markov Blanket and corresponding (non-equilibrium) steady state [5].”
Self-citationQuantum-like Qualia hypothesis: from Quantum Cognition to Quantum PerceptionPreprint
Tsuchiya, N., Bruza, P., Yamada, M., Saigo, H., & Pothos, E. M. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/9m5yp · Cited by 5
Seedat, A., Lepauvre, A., Jeschke, J., Górska, U., Armendáriz, M., Bendtz, K., Henin, S. E., Hirschhorn, R., Brown, T., Jensen, E., et al. (2025) · Scientific Data · doi:10.1038/s41597-025-04833-z · Cited by 9
“The experimental paradigm and associated data shared here were collected as part of a large-scale international adversarial collaboration testing key contradictory predictions of two prominent theories of Consciousness: 14 Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) 15–19 and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 20–23 .”
Self-citationDissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness
Findlay, G., Marshall, W., Albantakis, L., David, I., Mayner, W. G., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.04571 · Cited by 41
“According to IIT, a substrate can support consciousness—it is a complex—if and only if it fulfills the five postulates [18–20].”
InfluentialSelf-citationPrentner, R., & Hoffman, D. D. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1429376 · Cited by 11
Bajwa, I. J., Nilsen, A. S., Skukies, R., Aamodt, A., Ernst, G., Storm, J. F., & Juel, B. E. (2025) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-025-12695-z · Cited by 6
Self-citationPanpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness
Yurchenko, S. B. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105845 · Cited by 13
Upper bounds for integrated information
Zaeemzadeh, A., & Tononi, G. (2024) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012323 · Cited by 9
“TPMs.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationAlbantakis, L., Prentner, R., & Durham, I. T. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25101442 · Cited by 5
“…is not only a matter of simplification but also reflects a commitment of IIT to the principles of “operational physicalism” and “operational reductionism” [3], which imply that it should be possible to account for everything that can be manipulated and observed purely in terms of cause–effect power.”
BackgroundSelf-citationA Synergistic Workspace for Human Consciousness Revealed by Integrated Information DecompositionPreprint
Luppi, A. I., Mediano, P. A. M., Rosas, F. E., Allanson, J., Pickard, J. D., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Williams, G. B., Craig, M. M., Finoia, P., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.88173.3 · Cited by 6
Tsuchiya, N. (2024) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/492hu · Cited by 12
Huang, Y., Qiu, Z., Yu, X., Lee, S., Zeng, X., Chang, A., & Wiest, M. C. (2026) · Neuropharmacology · doi:10.1016/j.neuropharm.2026.110834 · Cited by 5
Functions of consciousness in emotional processing
Ludwig, D. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103801 · Cited by 6
Alnes, S. L., Aellen, F. M., Rusterholz, T., Pelentritou, A., Hänggi, M., Rossetti, A. O., Zubler, F., Marzia De Lucia, E., & Tzovara, A. (2025) · Resuscitation · doi:10.1016/j.resuscitation.2025.110531 · Cited by 5
The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension
Bellingrath, J. E. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad015 · Cited by 7
Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus
Roelofs, L., & Sebo, J. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02167-x · Cited by 6
“…plausible if we accepted an idea like the exclusion postulate of Integrated Information Theory (see e.g. Oizumi et al., 2014; Mørch, 2019, Albantakis et al. 2022), according to which as soon as two minds become connected enough to share an experience, they immediately cease to exist as…”
How to be an integrated information theorist without losing your body
Cea, I., & Signorelli, C. M. (2025) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2024.1510066 · Cited by 12
Testing the role of spontaneous activity in visuospatial perception with patterned optogenetics
Takahashi, K., Quero, S. P., Fiorilli, J., Benedetti, D., Yuste, R., Friston, K. J., Tononi, G., Pennartz, C. M. A., & Olcese, U. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0318863 · Cited by 8
Self-citationMathematized phenomenology and the science of consciousness
Prentner, R. (2025) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-025-10060-z · Cited by 19
Cañizares, J. S. (2023) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-023-00684-3 · Cited by 6
Understanding the qualitative nature of human consciousness
Song, C. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.10.005 · Cited by 6
Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans
Dykstra, A. R., Zhu, Y., Fernandez Pujol, C., Zhou, D. W., Jones, S. R., Marvan, T., & Bonaiuto, J. J. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.08.012 · Cited by 3
What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Páleník, J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262 · Cited by 4
Does neural computation feel like something?
Gidon, A., Aru, J., & Larkum, M. E. (2025) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2025.1511972 · Cited by 8
Filimonov, D., Koivisto, M., & Revonsuo, A. (2026) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2026.121762 · Cited by 6
“The IIT proposes a set of axioms regarding consciousness, which are subjectivity, specificity, unity, definiteness and structure, and that a physical substrate should be organized in a way that allows to implement them (Albantakis, 2020, 2023; Ellia et al., 2021; Tononi et al., 2022).”
InfluentialCategory theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project
Prentner, R. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04718-5 · Cited by 13
“0”, the central identity has been replaced by an “explanatory identity” (Haun and Tononi, 2019; Ellia et al., 2021; Tononi et al., 2022; Albantakis et al., 2023a,b) that supposedly carries less ontological weight, yet some of the arguments against the previous iteration of the theory seem also to…”
Human Brain Organoids and the Mereological Fallacy
Owen, M., Hight, D., & Hudetz, A. G. (2025) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-024-09577-y · Cited by 5
Leung, A., Mahmoud, A., Jeans, R., Fulcher, B., van Swinderen, B., & Tsuchiya, N. (2025) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3003217 · Cited by 4
“Integrated information theory [68–71] attempts to start from first principles, identifying universal aspects of consciousness and then deriving a multivariate measure, integrated information, which reflects the extent to which a system supports these aspects.”
Maffei, A., Gambarota, F., Liotti, M., Dell’Acqua, R., Tsuchiya, N., & Sessa, P. (2024) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2024.02.010 · Cited by 4
Wishful Thinking about Consciousness
Peter, G. (2024) · IgMin Research · doi:10.61927/igmin180 · Cited by 3
Sanfey, J. (2024) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e26080647 · Cited by 4
“The ID measure identifies which of the possible MIC repertoires maximises the information ‘received and sent correctly from and to the system’ and is most likely to be the one chosen by the system [5,23].”
BackgroundInfluentialMaldarelli, G., & Güntürkün, O. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0308 · Cited by 5
“The IIT explains consciousness by starting from the phenomenology of subjective experience and its essential properties [32].”
Mathematized Phenomenology and the Science of ConsciousnessPreprint
Prentner, R. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/8d2mf · Cited by 3
Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism
Seth, A. (2025) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/tz6an_v2 · Cited by 3
Li, J. (2025) · Natural Language Processing Journal · doi:10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163 · Cited by 3
Corcoran, A. W., Haun, A. M., Dorman, R., Tononi, G., Friston, K. J., & Pennartz, C. M. A. (2026) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2026.106742 · Cited by 2
Self-citationWagner‐Altendorf, T. A. (2024) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-024-00584-5 · Cited by 3
“The term “functional” here does not imply a merely correlational, but a causal approach, as recent versions of the IIT are explicitly based on connectivity (Albantakis et al., 2023).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., Sasai, S., Fujii, K., David, I., Hendren, J., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- ORCID
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2023-10-17
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e1011465
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- PMC
- PMC10581496
- OpenAlex
- W4387700987
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 104 · 2025: 92 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 31
- FWCI
- 75.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF0216, TWCF-2020-20526)
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation (UW 133AAG3451)
- National Research Council Canada (RGPIN-2019-05418)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, phenomenal experience, intrinsic information, causal relationship, quality of experience
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Information Theory, Models, Neurological
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