Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 59 of the 89 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
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## TL;DR
This paper presents IIT 4.0, a mathematical framework that defines consciousness as a substrate’s intrinsic cause–effect power, characterized by a maximal substrate (a complex) and its unfolded Φ-structure. Using simple example networks, the authors illustrate how connectivity, state, and architecture determine whether a system can support consciousness and what kind of experience it specifies.
## Key findings
- IIT 4.0 formalizes five phenomenal axioms as physical postulates: existence, intrinsicality, information, integration, exclusion, and composition; a conscious substrate must take and make a difference within itself, be specific, irreducible, definite, and structured.
- In example networks, bottlenecks and degeneracy keep complexes small and Φ low, while weakly connected modules split into separate complexes; for the 6-unit copy cycle, the paper reports a maximal φs = 1.74 ibits but low Φ = 7.65 because the Φ-structure contains only first-order distinctions.
- A specialized 6-unit lattice produced 27 distinctions out of 63 possible distinctions, yielding a much richer Φ-structure than the copy cycle.
- In the activity example, changing one unit’s state altered the Φ-structure substantially; when a unit was inactivated rather than merely inactive, its compound Φ-fold collapsed and the complex shrank.
- In the functional equivalence example, three systems with the same input–output function and equivalent global dynamics nonetheless had different Φ-structures: one had Φ = 21.01 ibits, another had Φ = 3.64 ibits, and the third was reducible with φs = 0 ibits.
## Methods
- The paper develops a mathematical formalism for IIT 4.0 based on a substrate’s transition probability matrix (TPM), then applies it to idealized binary networks in the Results and discussion.
- It identifies maximal cause–effect states using intrinsic information, then computes system integrated information (φs) via minimum partitions (MIPs), selects maximal substrates (complexes) by maximal φs, and unfolds cause–effect structures into distinctions and relations to obtain Φ.
- The worked examples use simple simulated systems of 5–6 binary units, analyzed with the “iit-4.0” feature branch of PyPhi.
## Limitations
- The authors state that a full analysis of complexes and their cause–effect structure is not feasible for realistic systems because exhaustive observations, manipulations, and calculations face multiple nested combinatorial explosions.
- They note that the framework is illustrated on extremely simple, simulated networks rather than actual substrates, so the examples are explanatory demonstrations rather than empirical analyses.
- They explicitly say IIT 4.0 is “work in progress,” and that some algorithmic choices remain open to further evaluation, including treatment of background conditions and tie resolution under TPM symmetries.
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In the paper
“Moreover, if the background conditions are well controlled, neurons are thought to interact in a highly reliable, nearly deterministic manner [41–43].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Results and discussion > Consciousness and connectivity
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [41] Mainen ZF, Sejnowski TJ. Reliability of spike timing in neocortical neurons. Science. 1995; 268(5216): 1503– 1506. doi: 10.1126/science.7770778 7770778 source
- Partly supportedcites [42] Hires SA, Gutnisky DA, Yu J, O’Connor DH, Svoboda K. Low-noise encoding of active touch by layer 4 in the somatosensory cortex. eLife. 2015; 4: e06619. doi: 10.7554/eLife.06619 26245232 PMC4525079 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says that accounting for hidden states and uncontrolled factors may reveal cortical spike trains to be deterministic and predictable. That supports the qualified idea that controlled conditions can reveal reliable spiking, but the paper does not establish that neurons generally interact in a nearly deterministic manner; its measurements concern layer 4 neurons during active touch. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Disputedcites [43] Nolte M, Reimann MW, King JG, Markram H, Muller EB. Cortical reliability amid noise and chaos. Nature Communications. 2019; 10(1): 1– 15. doi: 10.1038/s41467-019-11633-8 31439838 PMC6706377 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) describes the nearly deterministic view but then challenges it: even in tightly controlled in-vitro conditions, synaptic release is unreliable, so neurons respond less reliably to presynaptic inputs than to current injections. The paper reports highly reliable network responses under particular input conditions, not reliable interactions merely because background conditions are controlled. (LLM, conf=0.86)
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hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“This is a measure of the difference between two probability distributions which uniquely satisfies three properties (causality, intrinsicality, and specificity) that align with the postulates of IIT (but also have independent justification):”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] Barbosa LS, Marshall W, Streipert S, Albantakis L, Tononi G. A measure for intrinsic information. Scientific Reports. 2020; 10(1): 18803. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-75943-4 33139829 PMC7606539 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and discussion and Conclusion state that intrinsic difference (ID) captures a difference between probability distributions and is uniquely characterized by causality, specificity, and intrinsicality. The Introduction explains those properties, but the passages in our copy do not establish the additional claim that they align with IIT's postulates. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“However, to account for the structure of experience, considering only the cause–effect power of the individual units or of the system as a whole would be insufficient [17, 29].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Overview of IIT’s framework > Implementing the postulates
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [17] Grasso M, Albantakis L, Lang JP, Tononi G. Causal reductionism and causal structures. Nature Neuroscience. 2021; 24(10): 1348– 1355. doi: 10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8 34556868 source
- Supportedcites [29] Albantakis L, Tononi G. Causal Composition: Structural Differences among Dynamically Equivalent Systems. Entropy 2019, Vol 21, Page 989. 2019; 21(10): 989. source
Section 4.3 explains that a holistic account of visual experience misses its distinct spots and their relations, while a reductionist account of individual spots misses how they compose an extended scene. It also says that a system’s compositional cause–effect structure is needed to characterize the structure of phenomenal experience. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Because consciousness is the way it is, the formulation of its properties in physical, operational terms should be unique and based on quantities that uniquely satisfy the postulates [12, 32].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [12] Barbosa LS, Marshall W, Albantakis L, Tononi G. Mechanism Integrated Information. Entropy. 2021; 23(3): 362. doi: 10.3390/e23030362 33803765 PMC8003304 source
The Introduction says IIT translates properties of consciousness into physical postulates with a mathematical formulation. The Discussion says that, because the quantity and quality of consciousness cannot vary with an arbitrary choice of measure, a unique measure of intrinsic information based on the postulates is a critical requirement. This supports the cited principle, specifically as applied to that measure. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Supportedcites [32] Barrett AB, Mediano PAM. The phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2019; 26(1-2): 11– 20. source
The Abstract (p. 1) says that, for IIT’s account of consciousness to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Φ consistent with its axioms. The Introduction (p. 1) describes Φ as a proposed fundamental physical quantity. Together, these support the citing sentence’s claim about a unique physical formulation, though the paper argues that the current Φ does not yet meet that standard. (LLM, conf=0.89)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Selectivity means that if p < 1, the system’s causal power becomes subadditive (dilution) (see [14] for details).”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] Barbosa LS, Marshall W, Streipert S, Albantakis L, Tononi G. A measure for intrinsic information. Scientific Reports. 2020; 10(1): 18803. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-75943-4 33139829 PMC7606539 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Theory section says that adding a fully noisy independent channel dilutes intrinsic information and makes the measure sub-additive. Results and discussion specifies sub-additivity for some independent noisy distributions, not a general rule whenever p < 1; it attributes this behavior to intrinsicality rather than selectivity. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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In the citing paper
“It is important to emphasize that the absolute or isolated value of any IIT estimate lacks intrinsic meaning.”
From Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis (2025) · cites this paper as Albantakis et al., 2023
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In the citing paper
“Additionally, IIT, as it is presented by its original authors ( Albantakis et al., 2023 ), seems incompatible with any dimensionality of consciousness other than an overall Φ value”
From What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review (2024) · cites this paper as Albantakis et al., 2023
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Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT also makes several experimental predictions that have been validated in humans”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT is supported by growing scientific evidence about our own consciousness.For example, IIT provides a selfconsistent account of why the cerebral cortex is important for consciousness but the cerebellum is not, despite having four times more neurons; why consciousness fades in deep slowwave sleep, even though cortical neurons remain active; and why consciousness might have evolved”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT holds that a maximal F value will be reached primarily in posterior cortex (''hot zone'') 78,95 when dense reentrant interactions occur between higher and lower visual areas.7”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [95]
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Citations
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InfluentialSelf-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 2
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“…physical explanations that start from the laws of physics in order to derive from them the existence of consciousness, IIT starts instead with consciousness as an empirical given, in order to then illustrate the properties needed for it to occur in a physical substratum (Albantakis et al. 2023).”
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“…stimulus information [e.g., global neuronal workspace theory (Baars, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Mashour et al., 2020; Baars et al., 2021); higher order theory (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Brown et al., 2019); integrated information theory (Tononi et al., 2016; Albantakis et al., 2023)].”
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“Notably, IIT 4.0 has begun to address this limitation by incorporating the degree of noise and determinism in the binary unit activity [35].”
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“According to the formulation of IIT (Albantakis et al., 2023; Marshall et al., 2018, 2024), the physical substrate of consciousness is defined at the spatiotemporal resolution where Φ is maximized, as dictated by the exclusion postulate.”
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“2 Consider now the Integrated Information Theory 4.0 [50, 51].”
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“The theory has attracted its share of criticism (Sanfey, 2024; Albantakis, 2023; Barrett, 2014; Barrett, 2016; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Doerig et al., 2019; Fleming et al., 2023; Frankish, 2023; Merker et al., 2022), but the most serious critique targets IIT’s identity between structure and…”
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Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0011
A caveat regarding the unfolding argument: implications of plasticity
O’Reilly-Shah, V. N., Selvitella, A., & Schurger, A. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag027 · Cited by 3
“Indeed, the clinical use of perturbational complexity index (PCI) [21] to assess for signatures of consciousness is reliant on a long-window response to perturbation [22], a feature present in RNNs with specific intrinsic causal structure and absent in FNNs [22,23].”
The hard problem of consciousness
Schlicht, T. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00028-8
Rafiei, S. K. S., Anar, M. A., Shahinzadeh, A., Asgari, S., Hosseinpour, M., Rafiei, M., Sadr, S. H. N., & Kashkoli, M. M. (2026) · Theory in Biosciences · doi:10.1007/s12064-026-00478-7 · Cited by 1
“The two frameworks may therefore converge in some regimes while diverging sharply in others (Tononi et al. 2016 ; Albantakis et al. 2023 ; Tononi 2015 ; Oizumi et al. 2014 ; Mediano et al. 2022 ; Cerullo 2015 ).”
Rich Experience and Sparse Awareness: Sensing More Than We Know
berlinger, A., & Eitam, B. (2026) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009757126 · Cited by 1
Shifting the educational paradigm: Discovering concepts and connections
Rajan, K. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-22256-6.00006-3
Trukovich, J. J. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7038078
Consciousness and psychiatric disorders
Northoff, G., Lechner, S., & Arantes-Gonçalves, F. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00041-0
The Neural Correlates of Consciousness Project and its historical bias: Elements of critique
van Leeuwen, C. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00076-8
Bryant, A. G., & Whyte, C. J. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag029 · Cited by 1
“IIT identifies consciousness with the emergent cause–effect structure of physical systems ( Albantakis et al. 2023).”
Awake cortex stabilizes traveling waves for global and reliable information routing
Misawa, K., Chinen, K., Kawabata, A., Kaiju, T., Suzuki, T., & Komura, Y. (2026) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2026.116728
On the Shape of Intrinsic Information: A Unified Framework from Dynamical Systems
Carvalho, A. N., Langa, J. A., & Toscano, F. S. (2026) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/s10699-026-10042-7 · Cited by 1
The Metamind: Planetary Intelligence and the Emergence of Trans-Reflective ConsciousnessPreprint
Fournier, A. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7004278
Perspective as a Missing Structural Condition for Subjectivity in Active Inference Systems
Pae, H. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-33195-3_11
Quantum theory and consciousness
Pylkkänen, P. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00074-4
Loops all the way up: Recurrency as an implementation-first primitive for consciousness
Zheng, Z., Chis-Ciure, R., Waade, P. T., Eiserbeck, A., Aru, J., Andrillon, T., Jarraya, B., Melloni, L., Northoff, G., Rosas, F. E., et al. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2026.07.006 · Cited by 2
Jia, Y., Wang, J., Zhang, T., Zhu, S., Wang, N., He, Q., Cao, T., Chai, X., Zhai, Y., & Yang, Y. (2026) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2026.1866882 · Cited by 1
Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC): An overview
Northoff, G., Buccellato, A., & Zilio, F. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00039-2
A Phenomenological Glider? Enactivism and IIT in the Game of Life
Rodriguez, F., & Husbands, P. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-33185-4_10
Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions
de Leon, S. P., & Yoshimi, J. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag037
“Also note that in Bartlett (2022) and in IIT 4.0 ( Albantakis et al. 2023), “inactive” and “inactivated” are used instead of “silent” and “disabled”.”
InfluentialFocusing on Artificial Intelligence Through an Academic Lens
Hurlburt, G. F., & Keshavarz, H. (2026) · IT Professional · doi:10.1109/mitp.2026.3710901
Emergent multiscale organisation of neural dynamics fragments in anaesthesia
Milinkovic, B., Seth, A. C., Barnett, L., Carter, O. L., & Andrillon, T. (2026) · Imaging Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/imag.a.1364 · Cited by 5
“Future work should test whether the macros identified here align with predictions from Integrated Information Theory’s posterior “hot zone” ( Albantakis et al., 2023; Boly et al., 2017) or Global Neuronal Workspace Theory’s fronto-parietal broadcast ( Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al.,…”
From consciousness to observation: rethinking what consciousness science explains
Staller, M. S., & Körner, S. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1762212
From chemistry to cognition: the adaptive origins of consciousness under constraint
Stibel, J. M. (2026) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2026.1907922 · Cited by 1
Butto, N. (2026) · Journal of High Energy Physics Gravitation and Cosmology · doi:10.4236/jhepgc.2026.124100
On integrated information under Krohn-Rhodes decomposition
Mayeux, A. (2026) · Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1007/s10472-026-10021-5
Basri, J., BarAvi, P., & Hemmo, M. (2026) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2026.104121
Principal bundle geometry of qualia: Understanding the quality of consciousness from symmetry
Oizumi, M., Lim, C., & Kanai, R. (2026) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag261 · Cited by 2
Conscious Awareness Across the Visual Field
Cohen, M. A. (2026) · Annual Review of Vision Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-vision-111025-084618
Does the MEM Model Explain the "Hard Problem" of Phenomenal Consciousness?Preprint
Galus, W. L. (2026) · Qeios · doi:10.32388/bfdt0t.2
RIFT: A Fractal-Holographic Theory of Consciousness and Autopoietic Control
Bieberich, E. (2026) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci16090983 · Cited by 1
“These theories, together with IIT [7,36], GNW [9,10], and FEP [12,13], provide accounts of neural information integration, access, attention, memory, or action.”
The stuff matters: Consciousness, computation, and biology
Seth, A. K. (2026) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x26106906 · Cited by 3
Quantification of brain state into configuration entropy and complexity
Johnstone, C., & Alegaonkar, P. S. (2026) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2026.104132
Wiese, W. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2026.09.007
Pluralism within limits: how to make the idea of multiple NCC kinds useful
Kob, L., & Marvan, T. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag060
“We understand integrated information theory (Albantakis et al., 2023) to belong to this category, for example.”
Can Silicon Feel? Conditions for Artificial Valence and Their Implications for AI GovernancePreprint
Yauma, L. I. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-10666659/v1
Aithal, P. S., & Srinivasan, R. (2026) · Poornaprajna International Journal of Philosophy & Languages (PIJPL) · doi:10.64818/pijpl.3107.4634.0058
Conserved neural dynamics of anesthesia and the oblivion of species
Mashour, G. A., & Huang, Z. (2026) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-026-02399-6
New is Different: What Middle-Sized Things Teach about Causation
Cañizares, J. S. (2026) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-026-10489-0
Metadata
- Authors
- Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., Sasai, S., Fujii, K., David, I., Hendren, J., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- ORCID
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2023-10-17
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e1011465
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- PMC
- PMC10581496
- OpenAlex
- W4387700987
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 104 · 2025: 92 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 31
- FWCI
- 75.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF0216, TWCF-2020-20526)
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation (UW 133AAG3451)
- National Research Council Canada (RGPIN-2019-05418)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, phenomenal experience, intrinsic information, causal relationship, quality of experience
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Information Theory, Models, Neurological
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-09-28, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-09-28 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.