The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Significance of Consciousness
Abstract
Charles Siewert presents a distinctive approach to consciousness that emphasizes our first-person knowledge of experience and argues that we should grant consciousness, understood in this way, a central place in our conception of mind and intentionality. Written in an engaging manner that makes its recently controversial topic accessible to the thoughtful general reader, this book challenges theories that equate consciousness with a functional role or with the mere availability of sensory information to cognitive capacities. Siewert argues that the notion of phenomenal consciousness, slighted in some recent theories, can be made evident by noting our reliance on first-person knowledge and by considering, from the subject's point of view, the difference between having and lacking certain kinds of experience. This contrast is clarified by careful attention to cases, both actual and hypothetical, indicated by research on brain-damaged patients' ability to discriminate visually without conscious visual experience--what has become known as "blindsight." In addition, Siewert convincingly defends such approaches against objections that they make an illegitimate appeal to "introspection." Experiences that are conscious in Siewert's sense differ from each other in ways that only what is conscious can--in phenomenal character--and having this character gives them intentionality. In Siewert's view, consciousness is involved not only in the intentionality of sense experience and imagery, but in that of nonimagistic ways of thinking as well. Consciousness is pervasively bound up with intelligent perception and conceptual thought: it is not mere sensation or "raw feel." Having thus understood consciousness, we can better recognize how, for many of us, it possesses such deep intrinsic value that life without it would be little or no better than death.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2007) · doi:10.4324/9780203086599 · Cited by 1,512
“(1989), Flanagan (1992), Van Gulick (1997), and Siewert (1998).”
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
Perception and the Fall from Eden
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What catatonia can tell us about “top-down modulation”: A neuropsychiatric hypothesis
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility
KUNG, P. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00377.x · Cited by 310
Consciousness and Moral Status
Shepherd, J. (2018) · doi:10.4324/9781315396347 · Cited by 161
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
The biological function of consciousness
Earl, B. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00697 · Cited by 117
“Siewert (1998) gave examples of what he called “noniconic thinking,” everyday events when he considered his thoughts were neither expressed in pictures nor in words: suddenly realizing he might have missed an appointment; discovering he did not have his house key in its usual pocket, then…”
BackgroundBayne, T. (2008) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00122.x · Cited by 107
“Some theorists hold that cognitive states can enjoy proprietary phenomenal character (see e.g. Pitt 2004; Siewert 1998; Strawson 1994); others do not (see e.”
BackgroundWeisberg, J. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3 · Cited by 83
Concepts in the Brain: The View From Cross-linguistic Diversity
Kemmerer, D. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190682620.001.0001 · Cited by 42
Non-Human Moral Status: Problems with Phenomenal Consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2023) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2022.2148770 · Cited by 39
The scientific study of consciousness cannot and should not be morally neutral
Mazor, M., Brown, S., Ciaunica, A., Demertzi, A., Fahrenfort, J., Faivre, N., Francken, J. C., Lamy, D., Lenggenhager, B., Moutoussis, M., et al. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221110222 · Cited by 17
An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC
Kozuch, B. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae017 · Cited by 9
The structure of mind and the role of consciousness.
Earl, B. (2019) · JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE · doi:10.15640/jpbs.v7n2a9 · Cited by 5
“Consciousness also incorporates information that lacks qualia, such as knowledge of the identities of objects or knowledge of one's own intentions (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Siewert, 1998).”
BackgroundNeuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
Metadata
- Authors
- Siewert, C.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 1998-07-27
- OpenAlex
- W43396367
- Cited by
- 809
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 9.11
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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