The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Open accessAbstract
This paper experimentally examines image motivation the desire to be liked and well-regarded by others as a driver in prosocial behavior (doing good), and asks whether extrinsic monetary incentives (doing well) have a detrimental effect on prosocial behavior due to crowding out of image motivation. By definition, image depends on ones behavior being visible to other people. Using this unique property we show that image is indeed an important part of the motivation to behave prosocially. Moreover, we show that extrinsic incentives interact with image motivation and are therefore less effective in public than in private. Together, these results imply that image motivation is crowded out by monetary incentives; which in turn means that monetary incentives are more likely to be counterproductive for public prosocial activities than for private ones.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
Not just for the money: an economic theory of personal motivation
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-1009 · Cited by 1,955
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Akerlof, G. A. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885667 · Cited by 1,648
(1997) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,564
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 · Cited by 1,040
Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets
Heyman, J., & Ariely, D. (2004) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00757.x · Cited by 827
Self-citationPublic goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising
Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00040-9 · Cited by 740
Cited by
Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global Survey
Amel-Zadeh, A., & Serafeim, G. (2018) · Financial Analysts Journal · doi:10.2469/faj.v74.n3.2 · Cited by 1,721
Get Real! Individuals Prefer More Sustainable Investments
Bauer, R., Ruof, T., & Smeets, P. (2021) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhab037 · Cited by 552
The Dark Side of Competition for Status
Charness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747 · Cited by 510
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17579 · Cited by 227
Promoting cooperation in the field
Kraft-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006 · Cited by 178
Metadata
- Authors
- Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2051905954
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 25
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.1010620
- The paper
- Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2007). Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1010620
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
