Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
Citations
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Self-citationQuacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards
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“Brands need time to build their reputation to the point at which they can successfully communicate market signals (Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundPrivate vs. Collective Wine Reputation
Caracciolo, F., D’Amico, M., Vita, G. A. D., Pomarici, E., Bianco, A. D., & Cembalo, L. (2016) · The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.244704 · Cited by 51
“…in the economics literature, the role of a wine's reputation in price formation is still widely debated (Panzone 2011; Costanigro et al. 2010; Goldstein et al. 2008; Tirole 1996; Shapiro 1983) and the effect that private and collective reputation have on price formation is still unclear.”
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“Studies have shown that smaller margins between a premium product and market product can reduce the sales volume of the premium product (Shapiro, 1983; Anderson et al., 2003; Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Schollenberg, 2012).”
BackgroundHousing Quality in the Forward Contracts Market
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“Good corporate reputation helps attract and retain customers who value their association with reputable firms (Roberts and Dowling 2002) to the extent that some are willing to pay a premium price for their products and services (Shapiro 1983).”
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“Cooperative equilibria exist only when trading margins are high enough, and sellers discount future revenues sufficiently low (Dellarocas, 2005; Shapiro, 1983).”
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“…is also related to the literature in industrial organization, where market reputation can be an e¤ective mechanism to improve product quality (e.g., Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Kranton, 2003), and where market competition may have either positive or negative impacts on…”
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“When the costs of conforming (1)See for instance Grossman (1981) [10] and Shapiro (1983) [21].”
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“Customers value relationships with high-reputation firms and may pay a premium for offerings of high-reputation firms especially in uncertain markets and economies (Shapiro, 1983).”
Trust on the Dark Web: An analysis of illegal online drug markets
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“These commitments often depend on the other channel parties’ reputation for self-protection due to the lack of explicit law protection (or the cost of using the law mechanism is too high) (Klein & Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundUnderwriter reputation and the quality of certification: Evidence from high-yield bonds
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“…generally the case in the high-yield bond market.6 Reducing screening incentives or, more generally, product quality in response to increased competition and lower fees is consistent with the models of Strausz (2005) and Shapiro (1983) and empirical evidence provided by Shivdasani and Song (2011).”
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“…considered the situation (safeguard) in which the informed party signals that he or she is not interested in taking advantage of his or her private information using reputational capital (brand name) as a hostage (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Williamson, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).”
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Atkeson, A. G., Hellwig, C., & Ordoñez, G. L. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju034 · Cited by 44
“…in practice are not explicitly designed to screen entrants for quality.10 Second, instead of focusing on a utilitarian welfare criterion with heterogeneous consumer preferences as in Shapiro (1983) and much of the related literature, our model admits a representative household interpretation.”
BackgroundEnd‐Use Performance Uncertainty and Competition in International Wheat Markets
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“This practice reflects concepts embedded in the economics of quality and reputation (Shapiro 1983).”
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“2000), allow the firm to charge higher prices for its products or services (Shapiro, 1983) and enable the firm to defend its markets by deterring rivals from entering (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988).”
BackgroundEfficient Consumer Altruism and Fair Trade Products
Reinstein, D. A., & Song, J. T. (2012) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00323.x · Cited by 43
“As a baseline, we consider a vertically-structured industry with suppliers, retailers and consumers; this model is a variation of Shapiro (1983) or Klein and Leffler (1981).”
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“Thus, as q i = Q and ϕ j = Φ are equal across agents and firms, high quality equilibria are sustainable only if: We call inequality (3) the No Milking Condition (see Shapiro, 1983, and Allen, 1984), and the lowest price that satisfies condition (3) the No Milking Price p NM ( ϑ, Φ , Q ).”
Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets
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“The answer is that this can only be the case if the firm earns quasi-rents from being in business, i.e. there must be costs attached to going out of business, moving the firm’s capital elsewhere, and attracting new workers (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundDrinking Wine at Home: Hedonic Analysis of Sicilian Wines Using Quantile Regression
Vita, G. A. D., Caracciolo, F., Cembalo, L., Pomarici, E., & D’Amico, M. (2015) · American Journal of Applied Sciences · doi:10.3844/ajassp.2015.679.688 · Cited by 42
“…2005) and despite many authors having shown that labelling or reputation in many cases is the most adequate tool to define the quality of a product (Shapiro, 1983; Caracciolo et al., 2013), the price represents a very important signal that is able to inform consumers about the quality of a product…”
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“…the vast body of theory on asymmetric information, from Akerlof (1970) and Mussa and Rosen (1978), to the work on minimum quality standards (Leland, 1979; Shapiro, 1983; Bockstael, 1984; Boom, 1995) and GI labeling (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005; Moschini et al., 2008; Menapace and Moschini, 2011).”
BackgroundThe relationship between price and quality in the marketplace
Steenkamp, J. E. M. (1988) · De Economist · doi:10.1007/bf01803598 · Cited by 42
“(cf. Scitovszky 1945, Klein and Leffler 1981, Shapiro 1983 ).”
BackgroundPrivate Ordering on the Internet: The EBay Community of Traders
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“If a lemons problem was present, it could in principle be alleviated by the establishment of a premium for quality supported by reputation as identified by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1982, 1983).”
BackgroundUnderstanding the work beliefs of nonprofit executives through organizational stories
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Modelling the impact of corporate reputation on customers' behaviour
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shapiro, C.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shapiro, Carl
- ORCID
- Shapiro, Carl
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069630233
- Cited by
- 2,327
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 100 · 2015: 88 · 2014: 99 · 2013: 100 · 2012: 112
- FWCI
- 38.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- price-quality relationship, quality premium, reputation, information asymmetry, quality standards, consumer information, market exclusion, equilibrium pricing
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.