Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
Citations
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“A second strand of the economics literature deals with equilibrium pricequality schedules for markets where product quality is unobservable (see Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983; Allen 1984; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; and Judd and Riordan 1994).”
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“The Game-Theoretic Perspective The game-theoretic perspective on reputation advanced in economic studies is concerned with examining the influence of reputation on repeated competitive interactions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1982; 1986; Shapiro, 1983).”
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“14. Shapiro (1983) shows an analogous result for in the context of product quality.”
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“Following Shapiro (1983), we focus on the case in which all other factors of production are in perfectly elastic supply.”
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“…1996Þ. Focusing on the component of status driven by categorical identity helps further differentiate the concept of status from that of reputation ðShapiro 1983Þ and renders the conceptualization of status in organizational sociology more consistent with the approach of researchers who study…”
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“To isolate the importance of reputation, Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) develop models in which there is no legal system or other third-party system to enforce contracts.11 Indeed, many potential disagreements, e.g., over the quality of a cup of coffee, cannot easily be adjudicated by…”
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“In economics, reputation is related to a product’s price and quality [56,57].”
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“Jacoby, Olson et Haddock (1971) ainsi que Shapiro (1983) avancent que la réputation des entreprises sert d’indice pour l’évaluation des produits par les consommateurs et qu’une réputation positive signale un produit de qualité aux clients.”
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“Reputation is defined as the quality of the wine produced in the past (see Shapiro 1983, and Tirole 1996), which we measure by grades attributed to the château for previous vintages and the quality-based rank of the wine.”
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“…and eventually also to the establishment of ‘reputation goods’ where consumer choices were firmly made on the basis of expectations of product quality (Rogerson, 1983; Shapiro, 1982, 1983), and on the basis of a judgement about the reputation of the good among other consumers (Satterthwaite, 1979).”
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“1”
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“25Under free-entry, initial sunk investments dissipate the ex-post rents generated by the relationship (see, e.g., Shapiro (1983)).”
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“Shapiro (1983) and Zeithaml (1988) suggested that the reputation associated with a brand name is closely related to the perceived quality of the product or service.”
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“Though not overcoming the critique of multiple equilibria, Shapiro (1983) introduces an equilibrium in which firms choose the price and initially need to price below cost and exert effort to eventually earn a reputation premium — thus keeping the initial dissipation phase within part of the larger…”
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“…when faced with the threat of new competitors in the sector ( Kreps and Wilson, 1982 ; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982 ) and on the quality of products ( Klein and Leffl er, 1981 ; Shapiro, 1983 ; Allen, 1984 ) and services ( Wilson, 1983 ; De Angelo, 1981 ; Rogerson, 1983 ; Beatty and Ritter, 1986 ).”
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“…affects a customer’s choice among competing products (Akerlof, 1970), increases customer retention (Caminity, 1992; Selnes, 1994) and premium price (Shapiro, 1983), makes the firm an employer of choice (Stigler, 1962; Williamson, 1985), reduces contracting and monitoring costs because suppliers…”
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“To overcome these kinds of market failures and facilitate exchange, market participants may sometimes be able to develop reputations (Spence 1974), which represent the likelihood they will act in a particular manner (Shapiro 1983; Tadelis 1999).”
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“When buyers cannot observe product quality prior to the purchase, the reputation of the supplier provides a mechanism that signals superior quality (e.g. Shapiro, 1983; Riley, 2001).”
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“radially by the reciprocal of Shephard’s (1970) output distance function, is given by i j = i y j x j = sup i y j x j ∈ P i .”
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“Autores como Shapiro (1983) y Kirchhoff (2000) pusieron de manifiesto la relación entre el rendimiento derivado de la RS y la innovación.”
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“Once these sellers have built their reputations, they can charge higher prices, which will compensate them for their initial investment in reputation (Shapiro, 1983; Friedman and Resnick, 2001; Przepiorka, 2013).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Shapiro, C.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shapiro, Carl
- ORCID
- Shapiro, Carl
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069630233
- Cited by
- 2,327
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 100 · 2015: 88 · 2014: 99 · 2013: 100 · 2012: 112
- FWCI
- 38.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- price-quality relationship, quality premium, reputation, information asymmetry, quality standards, consumer information, market exclusion, equilibrium pricing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.