Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.
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In the citing paper
“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
Citations
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“Sellers with a good reputation will keep on providing high quality as an investment in future reputation as long as the potential gain of cheating buyers in the short run does not weigh up against the loss of reputation and future income from quality premiums (Shapiro, 1983; Klein and Leffler, 1980).”
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“2013) and higher willingness to pay (Shapiro 1983).”
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“Therefore they became in the past to a growing extent objects of huge managerial investment strategies for building up brand values in the long run (Shapiro 1983).”
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“Economists focus on the problem that in many situations customers’ pre-purchase evaluation of product quality is vague and partial, and thus, to economists, a firm’s reputation reflects the quality of the products it offers ( Shapiro, 1983 ).Sociologists usually replace the concept of reputation with the concept of st…”
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“Hence, a firm’s ability to signal trust, and thus engender customer confidence, becomes important as a guarantor of quality (Shapiro, 1983).”
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“they have the desire to build reputation (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983 and Allen,”
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“According to Shapiro (1983), for products where quality is difficult to observe prior to purchase, most buyers are willing to pay a premium for the seller’s investment in reputation.”
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“JEL Classi cation: D82, D44, L15, G14 Keywords: Information Asymmetry, Reputation E¤ects, eBay Auctions, Gmail Invitations”
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“It is believed that experience attributes are determinant in assuring repeated food sales, because it is the quality of similar products bought in the past (that is, one’s previous experiences) that serve as an indicator of present and future quality (Shapiro, 1983).”
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“Different types of reputation have been studied, but the most frequent is that related to product quality ( Shapiro, 1983”
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“Savings in search costs then enable reputable goods to receive price premiums which consumers are somewhat willing to pay (Stigler, 1961) and which compensate sellers for their investments in reputation (Shapiro, 1983).”
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“3 The same applies to the models of Choi ( 1998 ) , Klein and Leffler ( 1981 ) , and Shapiro ( 1983) .”
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“3 It has been recognized, in studies without search cost, that reputation can provide firms with incentives to furnish high quality for experience goods (e.g., Choi, 1998; Shapiro, 1983; Wernerfelt, 1988). reputation.”
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“Previous research indicates that quality consciousness about organic food varies mainly by consumers’ socio-demographic profile, health concerns, sex, and age (E Jeong & Jang, 2019; Shapiro, 1983).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shapiro, C.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shapiro, Carl
- ORCID
- Shapiro, Carl
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069630233
- Cited by
- 2,327
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 100 · 2015: 88 · 2014: 99 · 2013: 100 · 2012: 112
- FWCI
- 38.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- price-quality relationship, quality premium, reputation, information asymmetry, quality standards, consumer information, market exclusion, equilibrium pricing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.