Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
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“The information asymmetry problem is mitigated because consumers can punish firms for poor quality by making no further purchases of their products (Akerlof 1970; Shapiro 1983; Palfrey and Romer, 1983).”
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“These dynamics are an essential component of most models of reputation; see, for example, Shapiro (1982, 1983) and Diamond (1989).”
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“Early works in economics of information (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1982, 1983) supported by empirical studies (Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Erdem et al., 2006; Mishra et al., 1998) say yes.”
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Scamming and the reputation of drug dealers on Darknet Markets
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“This confirms Shapiro’s well-established prediction of a reputation premium for high-quality products (Shapiro (1983)).”
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“In theoretical discussions Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Nayyar (1990) and Shapiro (1983), argue that brand will be more important the more imperfect the information in the market, or the greater the ex ante information asymmetries.”
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Disentangling the effects of reputation and network position on the evolution of alliance networks
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“First, reputation – also referred to as reputational status (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) – of which the most important form is reputation that results from past performance (Shapiro, 1983).”
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“The feedback score is a hard-earned asset in terms of creating and maintaining this signal (Erdem and Swait, 1998; Shapiro, 1983).”
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“It differs on several points from the one developed by Shapiro (1983). to the development of quality strategies in the beef sector are the result of non-cooperative behaviour in the vertical chain and of obstacles to defining new forms of contractual arrangements to support these quality strategies.”
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“According to the economics perspective, uncertainty is reduced by the high quality of the firm’s products and other outputs (Shapiro 1982; 1983).”
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“In spite of this, we focus on reputation as a mechanism assuring quality when repeated purchases are possible (Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialAuditor's Reputation and Equity Offerings: The Case of Arthur Andersen
Rauterkus, S. Y., & Song, K. (2005) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00121.x · Cited by 56
Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information
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“This departs from the framework proposed by Shapiro (1983) ,”
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“The pioneering article by Klein and Leffler (1981) has been followed up by Shapiro (1983).”
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PRODUCT QUALITY, REPUTATION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE*
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“…quality, it is at the intersection of two literatures: the literature on reputations for product quality and the literature on tacit collusion.4 Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) consider models in which reputations are a mechanism to support high quality in a repeated moral hazard model.”
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“This is also in line with the positive quality–price relationship inherent in signaling theory (Shapiro 1983; Tellis and Wernerfelt 1987); the high quality signal of foreign ownership is attenuated by the low quality signal of the local past, resulting in only moderate quality expectations.”
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“In Shapiro (1983) firms build a reputation by selling high quality products at the low quality price upon entering the market, while in Allen (1984) consumers can infer product quality from the firm's choice of price and quantity.”
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A Hedonic Pricing Model for German Wine
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shapiro, C.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shapiro, Carl
- ORCID
- Shapiro, Carl
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069630233
- Cited by
- 2,327
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 100 · 2015: 88 · 2014: 99 · 2013: 100 · 2012: 112
- FWCI
- 38.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- price-quality relationship, quality premium, reputation, information asymmetry, quality standards, consumer information, market exclusion, equilibrium pricing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.