Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
Citations
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Self-citationQuacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards
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Advertising Spending and Quality for Services: The Role of Capacity
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“For similar assumptions in the literature see Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983) , Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), and Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1992).”
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“Considering the results from past performance as a reputation status (Shapiro, 1983), an actor’s record on innovation is a pertinent indicator for the other members of the network (Gould, 2002) as it presupposes solid knowledge and internal resources (Van der Vegt et al. 2006).”
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“For example, a firm’s investment in advertising can be considered a signal of a producer’s ability to produce quality products (Shapiro, 1983), and research and development (R&D) investments can be considered a signal of the firm’s innovative capability (Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Deeds, De…”
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“5 Derivation of (16) The condition W (0) ≤W (2) is equivalent to p(0) ≤ p(2)− 2F S (A.”
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“As for oligopolistic competition, researchers have, typically, assumed exogenously fixed product qualities or homogeneous goods (Leland (1979), Shapiro (1983), and Deneckere, Kovenock, and Sohn (2000)).”
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Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment
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“Companies can create a reputation for supplying goods of high quality and charge higher prices to recoup investments for quality as described by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983), among others.”
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Can Alternative Business Models Discipline Credit Rating Agencies?Preprint
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Experiências de Turismo Cervejeiro em Curitiba, PR
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BackgroundThe Antecedents and Consequences of Brand Image: Based on Keller’s Customer-Based Brand Equity
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“The extant empirical literature dealing with the auditor reputation revealed that firms have an economic incentive in employing reputed auditors in the sense that investors associate this reputation with firm’s reputation and are willing to pay higher price for the shares offered in primary market (Klein & Leffler, 19…”
BackgroundShorting Ethos: Exploring the Relationship Between Aristotle’s Ethos and Reputation Management
Shanahan, F., & Seele, P. (2015) · Corporate Reputation Review · doi:10.1057/crr.2014.19 · Cited by 33
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“The information asymmetry problem is mitigated because consumers can punish firms for poor quality by making no further purchases of their products (Akerlof 1970; Shapiro 1983; Palfrey and Romer, 1983).”
Unmasking Mutual Recognition: Current Inconsistencies and Future Chances
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Selling Reputation When Going Out of BusinessPreprint
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“Here, the argument is reminiscent of the ones by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) where the firm does not deceive customers because otherwise it would suffer a long-term loss of reputation.8 Finally, Cabral (2000) considers an adverse selection environment which, in some aspects, is…”
BackgroundCertification, Reputation and Entry: An Empirical Analysis
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Increasing willingness to pay in the food supply chain: a blockchain-oriented trust approach
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“Clearly, in this period, the actor’s profit is higher if δ = 1 and he obtains a ‘short-run gain’ in the sense of Shapiro (1983).”
Li, X. (2020) · Electronic Commerce Research · doi:10.1007/s10660-020-09404-5 · Cited by 32
“Economics scholars define a price premium as a price that yields above-average profit [23, 24].”
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“The PC factor is recognized as the most reliable predictor in purchase decisions over other product evaluations (C. Shapiro, 1983).”
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“The reputation associated with a brand name is closely related to the perceived quality of the product or service (Shapiro, 1983; Zeithaml, 1988).”
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“Shapiro (1983) donne un exemple où la ressource intangible est représentée par la réputation.”
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“Reputation effects have also been studied in the economics literature (Telser, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Shapiro, 1983; Tadelis, 1999).”
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“Customers tend to consider a good corporate reputation as a value signal of the underlying quality of the firm's products and services and may pay a premium for its offerings (Roberts & Dowling, 2002 ; Shapiro, 1983 ).”
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Ding, H.-B., & Pukthuanthong, K. (2013) · Journal of Business Economics and Management · doi:10.3846/16111699.2012.711359 · Cited by 32
“This accentuates the importance of signaling (Shapiro 1983).”
The effects of having more than one good reputation on distributor investments in the film industry
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“Besides past performance in terms of perceived quality by consumers (Shapiro 1983; Podolny 1993), there are many other sources of reputation in the literature that include certification by third parties (Rao 1994), ratings (Durand et al. 2007), reviews (Basuroy et al. 2003; Eliashberg and Shugan…”
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Bhaduri, S. N., & Selarka, E. (2016) · CSR, sustainability, ethics & governance · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-0925-9_2 · Cited by 32
Certification Mechanisms for Credence Attributes of Foods: Does It Matter Who Provides Diagnosis?
Sheldon, I. M. (2017) · Annual Review of Resource Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-resource-100516-053630 · Cited by 32
“…are supplied in equilibrium; the seminal articles are those by Allen (1984), Bagwell & Riordan (1991), Klein & Leffler (1981), Riordan (1986), and Shapiro (1983), which focus on mechanisms such as credible reputation building, price signaling and repeat purchase, and the role of informed…”
BackgroundDon't rest on your laurels: Reputational change and young technology-based ventures
Reuber, A. R., & Fischer, E. M. (2006) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.04.003 · Cited by 32
“This longitudinal evaluation is particularly important because the functional role of reputation is to reduce stakeholder uncertainty about the firm: bthe idea of reputation only makes sense in an imperfect worldQ (Shapiro, 1983: 659).”
BackgroundReputation and export performance: Danish butter exports and the British market, c.1880–c.1914
Higgins, D. M., & Mordhorst, M. (2008) · Business History · doi:10.1080/00076790701868601 · Cited by 32
“In the economics literature it has long been established that price premiums provide a reward for reputation and an incentive not to cheat on quality (see e.g. Klein & Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundAssaker, G., & Hallak, R. (2012) · Journal Of Vacation Marketing · doi:10.1177/1356766711435977 · Cited by 32
“In addition, the link between repeat purchase and brand loyalty can reduce price sensitivity among customers and can be a way of guaranteeing a product’s continued quality (e.g. Keane, 1997; Reicheld and Sasse, 1990; Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundNgokkuen, C., & Grote, U. (2012) · Zeitschrift für ausländische Landwirtschaft · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.155476 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Shapiro, C.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shapiro, Carl
- ORCID
- Shapiro, Carl
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069630233
- Cited by
- 2,327
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 100 · 2015: 88 · 2014: 99 · 2013: 100 · 2012: 112
- FWCI
- 38.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- price-quality relationship, quality premium, reputation, information asymmetry, quality standards, consumer information, market exclusion, equilibrium pricing
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.