Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets in which buyers cannot observe product quality prior to purchase. In such markets there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch on. In order to forestall such quality cutting, the price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost. This premium also serves the function of compensating sellers for their investment in reputation. The effects of improved consumer information and of a minimum quality standard on the equilibrium price-quality schedule are studied. In general, optimal quality standards exclude from the market items some consumers would like to buy.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Shapiro 1983
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“From this theoretical perspective, corporate reputation serves as a signal to a firm’s attributes or products (Shapiro 1983).”
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“Viewing the issue from the perspective of the seller, Shapiro (1983) proposed that sellers who had made a monetary investment in their reputation would likely later receive price premiums as a monetary reward from grateful buyers who would like to assure themselves of an uninterrupted supply of…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shapiro, C.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shapiro, Carl
- ORCID
- Shapiro, Carl
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069630233
- Cited by
- 2,327
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 100 · 2015: 88 · 2014: 99 · 2013: 100 · 2012: 112
- FWCI
- 38.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- price-quality relationship, quality premium, reputation, information asymmetry, quality standards, consumer information, market exclusion, equilibrium pricing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.