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The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology.
Abstract
A classic of phenomenology and existentialism, The Phenomenon of Life sets forth a systematic and comprehensive philosophy--an existential interpretation of biological facts laid out in support of his claim that the mind is prefigured throughout organic existence. Hans Jonas shows how life-forms present themselves on an ascending scale of perception and freedom of action, a scale reaching its apex in a human being's capacity for thought and morally responsible behavior.
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Citations
Cited by
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“Yet there is some consensus that the primary distinction between life and nonlife rests on the property of organization (Jacob, 1973; Jonas, 1966).”
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“The idea that metabolism creates a perspective of value on the world has been defended by Jonas (1966) and recently elaborated scientifically in terms of the theory of autopoiesis (Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007; Varela 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela 2002).”
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“…the rise of systems-theoretic approaches to biological organization (e.g., Bertalanffy, 1952), phenomenological approaches to philosophical biology (Jonas, 1966/2001, 1968), cybernetics (Ashby, 1960), and developmental psychology (Piaget, 1967/1971) that this tradition came closer to scientific…”
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The feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience
Aru, J., Larkum, M. E., & Shine, J. M. (2023) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2023.09.009 · Cited by 98
General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for ‘higher’ cognition
Bruineberg, J., Chemero, A., & Rietveld, E. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1716-9 · Cited by 91
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Di Paolo, E. A., & Iizuka, H. (2008) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2007.05.016 · Cited by 76
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Iizuka, H., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2007) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712307084687 · Cited by 49
“However, in the context of cognition a dynamical systems approach is highly compatible with views that seek to establish a continuity between life and mind, (Bourgine & Stewart, 2004; Di Paolo, 2005; Jonas, 1966; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Stewart, 1992; Weber & Varela, 2002; Wheeler, 1997).”
The role of regulation in the origin and synthetic modelling of minimal cognition
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“As pointed out already by Jonas in his criticism of cybernetics (Jonas, 1966), artificial self-stabilizing or self-regulating systems do not have an intrinsic goal ─ which, according to the early cyberneticians (Rosenblueth et al, 1943) was just to be identified with the final state ─ but follow…”
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Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence
Rafiee, B., & Sutton, R. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.24238
Metadata
- Authors
- Merlan, P., & Jonas, H.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1967-12
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 277
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012332703
- Cited by
- 916
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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