The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Arm's Length Relationships
Abstract
We show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats. Hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive. This phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible. Applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
“Schmidt (1996) and Cremer (1995) make the general point of how a principal's high powered incentives can reduce an agent's effort.”
BackgroundFormal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms
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Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
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The Wrong Kind of Transparency
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Proximity and Investment: Evidence from Plant-Level Data *
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“Globalization” and Vertical Structure
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Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device
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Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
Carrillo, J. D., & Mariotti, T. (2000) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00142 · Cited by 395
Acharya, V. V., Baghai, R. P., & Subramanian, K. V. (2013) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/674106 · Cited by 362
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids
Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. (2013) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ews028 · Cited by 361
Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
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Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions
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Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
Tirole, J. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.265 · Cited by 266
Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences
Grossman, Z. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.1989 · Cited by 176
Metadata
- Authors
- Cremer, J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-05-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 275-295
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2010884554
- Cited by
- 440
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 15.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.