The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public
Abstract
This paper focuses on the role of an initial public offering (IPO) in maximizing the proceeds an initial owner obtains in selling his company. In deciding whether to undertake an IPO, and what fraction of ownership to retain, the initial owner must balance two factors. By selling to dispersed shareholders, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of cash flow rights. However, by directly bargaining with a potential buyer, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of control rights. Whether a company should be private or public, as well as the insider's ownership in public companies, depends on the particular combination of majority control and dispersed ownership which maximizes the incumbent's wealth. The model provides implications on the strategy to be followed in selling a company as well as on the timing of IPOs and going-private transactions.
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Citations
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Cited by
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
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Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002 · Cited by 2,888
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x · Cited by 2,509
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Zingales, L.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-07
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 425
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2053074030
- Cited by
- 873
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 71.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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