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Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
Abstract
Foreword Robert Auman Acknowledgment 1. Introduction Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings 4. Strategic questions Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers 8. The assignment game 9. The generalization of the assignment model Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions Bibliography Indexes.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kamecke, U., Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O.
- Venue
- Economica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-11
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 236
- Pages
- 487
- ISSN
- 0013-0427 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2143529993
- Cited by
- 1,625
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 31.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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