The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DISAGGREGATING THE AGENCY CONTRACT: THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING, INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT, AND TERM IN OFFICE ON AGENT DECISION MAKING.
Abstract
Using a laboratory design, we examined the simple and interactive effects of monitoring and incentive alignment on managerial decisions. Length of term in office was a third independent variable. R...
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- TOSI, H. L., KATZ, J. P., & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1997-06-01
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 584-602
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1979682775
- Cited by
- 347
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 14.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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