The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Abstract
Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis behavior and the domestic reelection process. I assume that a leader's ability influences the outcome of a crisis. As such, voters use outcomes as a signal of their leaders' quality. Leaders have incentives to make statements that deter their enemies abroad, since these statements also enhance their standing at home. Yet, such “cheap talk” foreign policy declarations are only credible when leaders suffer domestically if they fail to fulfill their commitments. In equilibrium, false promises are only made by the least competent types of leaders. Leaders that break their promises suffer electorally. Because initial domestic conditions and institutional arrangements affect the vulnerability of leaders to these domestic costs, such factors influence the credibility of policy declarations and, therefore, the crisis outcome.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, A.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-09
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 623-638
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2056370346
- Cited by
- 458
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 37.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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