The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
Abstract
Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png; Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 104, Issue 2, 1 May 1989, Pages 39
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Citations
Cites
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Prescott, E. C., & Townsend, R. M. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911459 · Cited by 535
Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0 · Cited by 446
Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits
Melumad, N. D., & Mookherjee, D. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555686 · Cited by 188
Self-citation
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Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982 · Cited by 1,763
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice
Ghatak, M., & Guinnane, T. W. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00041-3 · Cited by 879
Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7473 · Cited by 843
Lending relationships in Germany – Empirical evidence from survey data
Harhoff, D., & Körting, T. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00061-2 · Cited by 808
Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview
Gertler, M. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2559 · Cited by 651
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
DeMarzo, P. M., & Fishman, M. J. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm031 · Cited by 431
Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game
Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. S. (1994) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555850 · Cited by 328
Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing
Matsusaka, J. G., & Nanda, V. (2002) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2001.0333 · Cited by 293
Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly
Diamond, D. W. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00669.x · Cited by 256
Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
Dionne, G., & Gagné, R. (2001) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/00346530151143824 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Mookherjee, D., & Png, I.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1989-05
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 399
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2015775939
- Cited by
- 581
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 25.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.