The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
Abstract
Decisions under uncertainty depend not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on its source, as illustrated by Ellsberg's observation of ambiguity aversion. In this article we propose the comparative ignorance hypothesis, according to which ambiguity aversion is produced by a comparison with less ambiguous events or with more knowledgeable individuals. This hypothesis is supported in a series of studies showing that ambiguity aversion, present in a comparative context in which a person evaluates both clear and vague prospects, seems to disappear in a noncomparative context in which a person evaluates only one of these prospects in isolation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citation“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
A theory of anticipated utility
Quiggin, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7 · Cited by 3,129
Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method
Becker, G. M., Degroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830090304 · Cited by 2,640
Keynes, J. M. (1973) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00843-8 · Cited by 2,575
Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity
(2004) · Uncertainty in Economic Theory · doi:10.4324/9780203358061-10 · Cited by 2,510
Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122575 · Cited by 1,795
Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty
Heath, C., & Tversky, A. (1991) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00057884 · Cited by 1,654
Self-citationContingent weighting in judgment and choice.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.371 · Cited by 1,567
Self-citationWeighing risk and uncertainty.
Tversky, A., & Fox, C. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.2.269 · Cited by 913
Self-citationExpected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities
Gilboa, I. (1987) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(87)90022-x · Cited by 818
Ambiguity and uncertainty in probabilistic inference.
Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1985) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.92.4.433 · Cited by 816
Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion, and the Optimal Choice of Portfolio
Dow, J., & da Costa Werlang, S. R. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951685 · Cited by 773
Intertemporal asset pricing under knightian uncertainty
(2004) · Uncertainty in Economic Theory · doi:10.4324/9780203358061-24 · Cited by 592
Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights
Tversky, A., & Wakker, P. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171769 · Cited by 569
Self-citationJarrett, R. F., & Savage, L. J. (1956) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1418176 · Cited by 558
Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance
Curley, S. P., Yates, J. F., & Abrams, R. A. (1986) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(86)90018-x · Cited by 522
Distortion of Subjective Probabilities as a Reaction to Uncertainty
Fellner, W. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884325 · Cited by 232
Uncertainty from internal and external sources: A clear case of overconfidence.
Howell, W. C. (1971) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0031206 · Cited by 60
Preferences for Different Combinations of Chance and Skill in Gambling
Cohen, J., & Hansel, C. E. M. (1959) · Nature · doi:10.1038/183841a0 · Cited by 29
Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Experimental methods: Between-subject and within-subject design
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Kuhn, M. A. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.08.009 · Cited by 1,469
"Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535153 · Cited by 1,452
Metadata
- Authors
- Fox, C. R., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-08-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 585-603
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2144810549
- Cited by
- 1,022
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 2.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.