The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World
Open accessAbstract
This paper uses cross-national data to examine the effects of federal fiscal and political institutions on the fiscal performance of subnational governments. Balanced budgets among subnational governments are found when either (1) the center imposes strong borrowing restrictions or (2) subnational governments have both wide-ranging taxing and borrowing autonomy. Large and persistent aggregate deficits occur when subnational governments are simultaneously dependent on general-purpose intergovernmental transfers and free to borrow-a combination found most frequently among constituent units in federations. Time-series cross-section analysis reveals that as countries increase their reliance on transfers over time, subnational and overall fiscal performance decline, especially when subnational governments have easy access to credit. These findings illuminate a key dilemma of fiscal federalism and a more precise notion of its dangers: When constitutionally constrained or politically fragmented central governments take on heavy co-financing obligations, they cannot credibly commit to ignore the fiscal problems of lower-level governments.
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The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
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The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
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A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective
FALLETI, T. G. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051695 · Cited by 628
Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints
(2003) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3021.001.0001 · Cited by 624
Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government
Rodden, J. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303574021 · Cited by 462
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Rodden, J.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002-07
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 670
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2084044426
- Cited by
- 728
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 147.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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