The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
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Citations
Cites
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Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
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Self-citationThe Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
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Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?Preprint
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Self-citationA Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
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Self-citation
Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
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Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Countries
Alesina, A., Perotti, R., Giavazzi, F., & Kollintzas, T. (1995) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344590 · Cited by 764
Self-citationWhy Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
Alesina, A., Campante, F. R., & Tabellini, G. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.1006 · Cited by 754
Self-citationGlobal Capital and National Governments
Mosley, L. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672 · Cited by 617
The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1994) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/8.3.351 · Cited by 580
Self-citationKopits, G., Symansky, S., GKopits@imf.org, & SSymansky@imf.org (1998) · Occasional Papers · doi:10.5089/9781557757043.084 · Cited by 521
Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America
Alesina, A., Hausmann, R., Hommes, R., & Stein, E. (1999) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00012-7 · Cited by 510
Self-citationPerotti, R., & Kontopoulos, Y. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00146-3 · Cited by 497
Self-citationTied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
Battaglini, M., & Coate, S. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.201 · Cited by 421
E LECTORAL AND P ARTISAN C YCLES IN E CONOMIC P OLICIES AND O UTCOMES
Franzese, R. J. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080924 · Cited by 416
Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States
Mosley, L. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551352 · Cited by 388
Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach
Pettersson-Lidbom, P. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.1037 · Cited by 388
Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00076-2 · Cited by 366
Economic, political, and institutional determinants of public deficits
Woo, J. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00143-8 · Cited by 318
Constitutions and Economic Policy
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Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States
Lowry, R. C., Alt, J. E., & Ferree, K. E. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586302 · Cited by 298
Political Economics and Public Finance
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7097 · Cited by 279
Helgadóttir, O. (2016) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2015.1106573 · Cited by 271
Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries
Ardagna, S., Caselli, F., & Lane, T. (2007) · The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics · doi:10.2202/1935-1690.1417 · Cited by 267
Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1996) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.2139/ssrn.882952 · Cited by 265
Self-citation(2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Alesina, A., & Perotti, R.
- Venue
- Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund
- Published
- 1995-03
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0020-8027 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124542543
- Cited by
- 694
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 42.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.